



To Want Nothing: 











A Thesis Submitted to 
Atlantic School of Theology, Halifax, Nova Scotia 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for 









Copyright David John DeCoste, 2013. 
 
Approved: Dr. David Deane 
  Supervisor 
 
Dr. Susan Slater 
Examiner 
 
        Dr. Neil Robertson 
        Examiner 
 






To Want Nothing: A Badiouian Reading of Radical Orthodoxy 
 
by David John DeCoste 
 
April 3, 2013 
 
This thesis argues that Alain Badiou presents a challenge to Radically Orthodox thinkers 
by claiming that theological discourse on being can only articulate a description of a 
structured presentation of an inconsistent multiplicity; a situation referred to throughout 
the thesis as “a Badiouian thinking of the One.” The argument begins by explaining how 
in the contemporary context Badiou identifies two forms of thinking the One: positivism 
and theology. It follows that if positivism and theology are two forms of the same 
thinking then there must be common elements or logics at work in their separate 
discourses. Three elements shared by both discourses are shown to be at work in both a 
positivist project—Daniel Dennett’s philosophy of consciousness—and a theological 
project—Radical Orthodoxy. Ultimately, in establishing how the three elements are 
common to both discourses Radical Orthodoxy is identified as an example of a Badiouian 
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In very general terms Alain Badiou’s seminal text, Being and Event, describes philosophy 
as a movement to establish new possibilities in thinking. The inscription of this 
movement is defined in general by the formula, Ø → ω, and in the particular case by the 
formula, 0 → 1. From these formulae the movement of philosophy is understood to begin 
from a nihilist position, “0” or the void, and move into an affirmative position, “1” or the 
multiple; however, philosophy is not reducible to either of these two separate positions. If 
thought only resides on the side of the void it assumes a nihilist position claiming that all 
there is is negativity. Likewise, if thought only resides on the side of the multiple it 
assumes either a positivist or theological position claiming that all there is is the One; I 
will refer to this position throughout this thesis as “a Badiouian thinking of the One.” 
Interestingly, in a 2010 lecture delivered at the European Graduate School in Saas-Fee, 
Switerland, Badiou named a fourth position—in addition to the philosophical, the nihilist, 
and the positivist/theological—which thought may assume: the mystical.
1
 In this lecture 
Badiou explored the intriguing view that philosophy is not opposed to mysticism to the 
same degree in which it is opposed to nihilism or positivism/theology. This is because for 
Badiou both philosophy and mysticism in some sense describe the same type of 
movement. More specifically, in contrast to nihilism and positivism/theology, philosophy 
and mysticism share two fundamental points: first that the experience of nothingness is a 
necessity and second that we can go beyond nothingness. In both fields of thought, the 
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beginning point is an experience of negativity followed by a transformation into the 
subjective. 
Where philosophy and mysticism differ is in how they regard this movement from 
nothing to something to transpire. In philosophy the movement is of a systematic nature. 
Badiou identifies philosophy’s movement as a series of steps or as a construction. Within 
this process there is the production of difference by means of a process of sameness. 
Badiou illustrates this process through a description of the set of natural numbers: there 
are infinite natural numbers, each different from the other, and yet they are constructed 
via the same process, n = n + 1. Although this process, n = n + 1, is oriented towards the 
infinite, the infinite as such is not produced by the process. In philosophy, Badiou 
observes this form of repetitive operation or process in such examples as the metaphysics 
of Descartes or the Hegelian dialectic. Mysticism on the other hand considers an 
instantaneous movement. In submitting to one’s own nothingness the individual opens 
herself up to accessing the infinite in a closed and intimate relationship. Unlike 
philosophy, the expression of the mystical experience is poetical; as found in the writings 
of Julian of Norwich or Saint John of the Cross. 
The purpose of this thesis is to present an example of a contemporary positivist 
ontology, Daniel Dennett’s philosophy of consciousness, and an example of a 
contemporary theological ontology, Radical Orthodoxy’s analogia entis, with the 
intention of demonstrating how both discourses on being ultimately belong to what I refer 
to as a Badiouian thinking of the One. To do so I argue that both the discourse of Dennett 
and the discourse Radical Orthodoxy use the same logic by which to articulate their 
separate ontologies. It is important to note that in making this argument I am not 
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implying that such logic is intrinsic to all forms of signification. On the contrary, with 
Badiou I argue there is an alternative logic, based upon a Cantorian understanding of 
number, by which one may think differently; namely, in terms of what he describes as the 
philosophical or the mystical. 
In Section 1.0 of this thesis, I present Daniel Dennett’s philosophy of an 
evolutionary consciousness, what I refer to as a “naturalized ontology,”
2
 with the 
intention of using it as an example of a positivist ontology belonging to the Badiouian 
category of a thinking of the One. I use Dennett as an example not with the intention of 
renouncing his work, but rather because of how well it operates in accordance with 
Badiou’s categorization. To demonstrate its fittingness I first establish two fundamental 
points: first, in Section 1.01, “Evolutionary progression,” that an evolutionary model of 
consciousness needs to be understood as natural progression, and second in Section 1.02, 
“Positing an abstraction: Dennett’s Universal Acid,” that an evolutionary model of 
consciousness requires the positing an abstraction (a True-reality or True-exception) by 
which to engage with reality. After doing so, in Section 1.03, “Number: A closed whole,” 
I describe, apropos Alain Badiou, the understanding of number that governs the elements 
described in Section 1.01 and 1.02 and furthermore how it is this notion of number that 
governs any Badiouian thinking of the One. 
After establishing how Dennett’s philosophy serves as an example of a positivist 
ontology belonging to the Badiouian category of a thinking of the One, in Section 1.1, I 
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 This is to say, “a thoroughly naturalized ontology, one that explains all entities on a single model, as 
assemblages of ‘dynamic quanta,’ the incessant change and transformation of which is the result of 
successful and unsuccessful attempts by each assemblage to extend its control over environing 
assemblages.” Christoph Cox, Nietzsche: Naturalism and Interpretation (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1999), 79. 
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make a similar argument in regards to the theological project of Radical Orthodoxy. 
Again, like in regards to the work of Dennett, I choose Radical Orthodoxy not with the 
intent of renouncing the movement in general, but rather because of how well it operates 
in accordance with the Badiouian category of a thinking of the One. Like the work of 
Dennett, Radical Orthodoxy has given great attention to the question of what is, striving 
to posit a true ontological discourse, the Thomistic analogia entis, in response to what it 
understands as the dominant and erroneous ontological discourse in late modernity, Duns 
Scotus’s univocity of being. To establish Radical Orthodoxy as an example of a 
Badiouian thinking of the One, like in the first section of this thesis, in Sections 1.11, 
1.12 and 1.13, I establish how Radical Orthodoxy posits an abstraction which is 
evolutionary in nature (even if it has perhaps over the last 700 years or so been 
devolving) and as a consequence operates in accordance with a specific form of number 
(that which was described in Section 1.03). Ultimately, my considerations of the work of 
Dennett and Radical Orthodoxy intend to suggest that in the contemporary context, what 
I will refer to as late modernity, Badiou’s categories of philosophy and mysticism are 










1.0 Thinking the One: A Positivist Example 
 
In the first six months of 2012 the North American popular science magazine
3
 with the 
greatest number of copies in paid and verified circulation in North America was Popular 
Science. With 1 350 685 copies in circulation, Popular Science had more than twice as 
many copies in circulation as the second place magazine, Discover, which still had an 
impressive 599 196 copies in paid circulation. In a close third place was Scientific 
American with 486 293 copies in paid circulation.
4
 To put these numbers into context, out 
of the five hundred and eighty nine North American magazines examined, Popular 
Science placed just behind Playboy with the fifty seventh most magazines in circulation. 
Discover came in one hundred and twenty sixth place and Scientific American came in 
one hundred and fiftieth place.
5
 Such data clearly establishes there to be an interest in 
popular science within contemporary culture; a fact which is not surprising given the 
fascinating research presently taking place in such fields as neuroscience and technology. 
 For example, consider Rebecca Boyle’s August 2011 article published on the 
Popular Science website entitled, “New Computer Chip Modeled on a Living Brain Can 
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 To be specific, by “popular science magazine” I mean periodical publications with columns featuring 
news, opinions and reports on scientific topics aimed at being accessible a non-academic audience. For 
example, Scientific American or Discover. This form of science magazine would be contrasted to a peer-
reviewed scientific journal in which professional scientists would strive to publish within based upon their 
particular field of expertise. For example, the Journal of the American Chemical Society or Nuclear 
Instruments and Methods in Physics Research. 
4
 Audit Bureau of Circulations. 2012. http://abcas3.accessabc.com/ecirc/magtitlesearch.asp (accessed 
September 1, 2012). 
5
 Audit Bureau of Circulations. 2012. http://abcas3.accessabc.com/ecirc/magtitlesearch.asp. Accessed 





 In the article Boyle describes IBM’s recent invention of a 
computer chip based on the neurological circuitry map of a macaque monkey. By 
reverse-engineering the neural networks of the monkey’s brain the chip intends to pave 
the way for future cognitive computer systems that can think as efficiently as the human 
brain. These “neurosynaptic chips” exceed the traditional ability of computers to simply 
do yes-or-no tasks in that they now have the ability to remember and learn from their own 
actions. Dharmendra Modha, the project leader for IBM Research, is quoted as saying, 
“[The chip] integrates memory with processors, and it is fundamentally massively 
parallel and distributed as well as event-driven, so it begins to rival the brain’s function, 
power and space.” According to IBM the new technology resulting from the development 
of such brain-based chips is not intended to replace traditional computers, rather, they 
will work together with traditional computers to “serve humanity.” For example, consider 
how if a human grabs a piece of rotten fruit the senses of touch, smell, and sight instantly 
work together to determine the fruit is bad. Traditional computers cannot handle that 
amount of detail from so many different inputs; however, with the development of brain-
based chips it becomes possible. In this way, for example, a cognitive computer in the 
future could monitor numerous unique variables in the ocean via a network of different 
inputs and determine whether or not a major weather event such as a tsunami is going to 
occur. The research is continuing to develop as IBM scientists study more monkey brains 
and even cat brains, but as Boyle says, “it will be quite some time before computer chips 
can truly match the ultra-efficient computational powerhouses that nature gave us.” 
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 Rebecca Boyle. 2011. http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2011-08/first-generation-cognitive-
chips-based-brain-architecture-will-revolutionize-computing-ibm-says (accessed September 8, 2012). 
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In July 2012, Ian Chant reported on the Popular Science website that two Cornell 
University students, Charles Moyes and Mengxiang Jiang, built a version of the classic 
video game “Pong” in which players control the onscreen paddle with their minds.
7
 An 
electroencephalography (EEG) machine connected to a player’s head reads the faint 
electrical signals in the brain. These signals, which come in the form of waves, are then 
run through an amplification circuit where they are then filtered and boosted. It is then 
possible to digitize the amplified information and send it through a USB to a computer 
which determines the behavior of an onscreen paddle. Intensifying one’s concentration 
moves the paddle one way, while relaxing one’s concentration moves the paddle the other 
way. 
And popular science magazines are only one example of how the brain is linked 
to computer technology in contemporary culture. Science fiction movies like the 
Terminator series (1984, 1991, and 2003), AI (2001) or Wall-E (2008), all imagine a 
world in which there are computer-based robots with the ability to “think” and, at least to 
some extent, experience emotion. The Rise of the Planet of the Apes (2011) tells the story 
of how a pharmaceutical company develops a drug which allows ape brains to evolve at a 
much faster rate than usual. Best-selling authors such as Raymond Kurzweil have in 
some cases very accurately predicted the development of technologies and their 
integration with humanity.
8
 Such a vast array of examples demonstrate how visualizing 
the brain as a computer is fascinating in that there are practical aspects in regards to 
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 Ian Chant. 2012. http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2012-07/brainwave-controlled-version-
pong (accessed September 8, 2012). 
8
 Raymond Kurzweil, The Age of Intelligent Machines (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992). 
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science and technology, and yet at the same time, such examples are terrifying insofar as 
they present a strange philosophy of being. 
Daniel Dennett has gone to great lengths over the past forty years to develop a 
philosophy of consciousness that coherently describes how and why the human mind is in 
essence a computer. In what follows I present a summary of the story Dennett composes 
to arrive at his hypothesis that “conscious human minds are more-or-less serial virtual 
machines implemented—inefficiently—on the parallel hardware that evolution has 
provided for us.”
9
 In presenting Dennett’s philosophy I aim to neither critique nor 
promote his ideas, but rather to establish how such an understanding of the mind can be 
derived. Dennett is a fitting thinker to engage given the fact that he has enjoyed immense 
popularity over the last twenty years or so, particularly since the publication of his best-
selling books, Consciousness Explained, in 1991 and, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, in 1995. 
After engaging Dennett’s positivist philosophy as a Badiouian example of a thinking of 
the One, I can then proceed to examine the extent to which such elements are also at 
work within the theological project of Radical Orthodoxy. 
In his book, Consciousness Explained, Daniel Dennett argues that because it is 
possible to scientifically posit a time in which there was no human consciousness, then 
consciousness itself must have developed from prior phenomena which were not in 
themselves instances of human consciousness.
10
 It follows that through an examination of 
the various speculative possibilities in regards to how the transitions from (a) no 
consciousness to (b) consciousness to (c) rationally developed human consciousness 
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 Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1991), 218. 
10
 Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 171. 
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occurred, it is possible to gain insight into the true nature of consciousness in-itself. The 
strategy behind this approach is evolutionary insofar as it hopes to learn about the nature 
of consciousness by describing the mechanisms governing its fundamental behavioral 
advancement. Dennett distinguishes an evolutionary approach from an approach wherein 
one first assumes the behavior of consciousness as a given and then proceeds to reason a 
priori to determine the mechanisms at work in the brain. In contrast, an evolutionary 
approach to explaining consciousness is done through the use of narrative. As such, and 
rather than surveying the numerous narratives dedicated to explaining the evolution of 
consciousness, Dennett elects to borrow freely from numerous theorists in composing a 




 Dennett begins his story by imagining a world in which there were no material 
objects that could be said to have interests of any kind. A world void of objects with 
interests implies a world void of reasons. In this strange world there are only causes. In 
accordance with the thought of Richard Dawkins, Dennett then imagines the emergence 
of simple replicators which, although unaware of their interests, contain the primitive 
interest of self-replication. In a very simple way it could be said that such interests can be 
classified as “good” if they allow for replication and on the other hand “bad” if they do 
not allow for replication: a process which Dennett refers to as “the business of self-
preservation.”
12
 Within this business it is important to construct boundaries between the 
self and the external world. As Dennett describes, “this distinction between everything on 
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the inside of a closed boundary and everything in the external world — is at the heart of 
all biological processes, not just ingestion and excretion, respiration and transpiration.”
13
 
Thus, for Dennett, and this will be a significant point in later sections of this thesis when 
questioning such concepts as good-ness, we see the beginnings of a mind which is by 
design a self-sustained closed whole. 
 As the simple replicators evolved into more and more developed creatures they 
formed the need to cultivate new and better ways to “produce future”: what Dennett 
refers to as the fundamental purpose of the brain.
14
 To understand what Dennett means 
here by producing future, one must first understand that for Dennett the brain is 
essentially an anticipating machine. For example, when a baby experiences a sense of 
falling, regardless of whether or not she is really falling, her body will immediately 
become stiff as a board. In this way, if the baby really does fall, having locked her body 
up tightly she is less likely to hurt her back and neck upon impact. This reaction or 
anticipation, commonly referred to as the startle reflex, is genetically hard-wired into a 
baby’s nervous system. Such a trait makes the baby a better anticipator, and consequently 
babies with this gene have generally had a better chance of survival. Having a better 
chance of survival means these babies had a better chance of passing on this gene, and as 
such most if not all babies today have the startle reflex. Another example is the ability to 
recognize a vertical axis of symmetry. Virtually the only things in the wild that showed 
vertical axis symmetry were the faces of other animals, thus in recognizing vertical axis 
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symmetry animals were able to anticipate the presence of enemies and flee before being 
eaten. 
Dennett explains how orienting responses such as these developed into more risky 
and engaged forms of exploration and as a result new behavioral strategies began to 
evolve. Animals began to acquire information for its own sake, Dennett refers to this 
phenomenon as the birth of curiosity. Animals become what George Miller refers to as 
“informavores: organisms hungry for further information about the world they inhabited 
(and about themselves).”
15
 This leads into the evolution of two specialized areas in the 
brain: the dorsal and the ventral. On the one hand, the dorsal became the auto-pilot 
portion of the brain, always on the look-out for any sign of danger. On the other hand, the 
ventral became the special part of the brain which was able to focus on specifics without 
having to worry about who was looking out for immediate danger. Fascinatingly, this 
single strand in the evolutionary history of the nervous system reveals the most basic 
evolutionary mechanism, that is, that a selection of particular genotypes, or gene 
combinations, can prove to yield better adapted individuals, or phenotypes, than the 
alternative genotypes.
16
 This idea implies that we can now imagine the emergence of 
individual phenotypes whose innards are not entirely hard-wired, but are variable or 
plastic, and as such, can learn during their own lifetimes. This phenomenon allows for 
two new conditions under which evolution occurs: (1) greater speeds than unaided 
genetic evolution and (2) natural selection. 
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Referencing Hume’s problem, Dennett continues his story of the evolution of 
human consciousness by stating that we must make two assumptions: (1) that nature stays 
what it is
17
 (for example, the laws governing gravitational forces, electromagnetic forces, 
the elements of the periodic table, the startle reflex, vertical axis recognition), and citing 
Dawkins, (2) that there are other processes in nature which are chaotic. The fact that this 
is the case leads to evolutionary redesign via learning or development. Dennett readily 
admits that the distinction between these two categories is gray: for example, do babies 
learn to walk or do they develop the skill of walking? Because placing a dividing line 
between the two categories is so difficult, Dennett decides to refer to anything from 
learning to focus one’s eyes to learning quantum mechanics  as postnatal design fixing. 
He then describes how the process of postnatal design fixing can be accomplished 
because “the plastic brain is capable of reorganizing itself adaptively in response to the 
particular novelties encountered in the organism’s environment.”
18
 Some of these 
postnatal design fixings are what Dennett refers to extensively as a Good Trick: “a 
behavioral talent that protects [a particular species’] or enhances [a particular species’] 
chances dramatically.”
19
 Through a process called the Baldwin Effect, Good Tricks are 
capable of being passed on genetically. For example, suppose that in an animal’s brain 
there are five spaces which compose its wiring, each of which can be wired in one of two 
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 It is significant to note that the recent philosophical movement referred to as “Speculative Realism” 
challenges this idea. See, for example, Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of 
Contingency (New York: Continuum, 2008). In this fascinating text Meillassoux argues that Hume’s 
problem can be transformed into an opportunity for contemporary philosophy. See also Ian Hamilton 
Grant’s paper, “Does Nature Stay What-it-is?: Dynamics and the Antecedence Criterion” in The 
Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism edited by Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek and Graham 
Harman (Melbourne: re.press, 2011). 
18
 Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 184. 
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 Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 184. 
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ways (obviously an over-simplified example, but only because it intends to clarify the 
idea). If we call those two ways of being wired 0 and 1, then an example of a single 
specific wiring could be any combination of zeros and ones: for example, 00011, 11110 
or 10101. If the combination, 01110 represents a Good Trick, then those animals with 
wirings closest to 01110—say 01111 or 01100, but definitely not 10001—will be the 
most likely to “learn” the proper wiring in their lifetime and thus pass on their genes. 
Eventually the whole species of animal will move toward the wiring of the Good Trick. 
All animals with phenotypic plasticity, even the “lowly toad”
20
, operate in accordance 
with the Baldwin Effect; however, the human brain has evolved as the best brain capable 
of honing these Good Tricks. 
To answer the question of how humans achieved this feat, Dennett describes how 
his story thus far brings us to higher level primates whose brains are regularly flooded 
with multimedia information. This stage in the evolution of human consciousness 
presents a new issue, that is, the problem of higher level control, however, this problem 
opens up “a new portion of design space.”
21
 Up to this point in the history of the 
conscious mind the nervous system dealt with the question, “What to do now?”, to which 
it was only capable of responding with a limited selection of actions; what Dennett 
playfully refers to as a modest elaboration of the four F’s: fight, flee, feed or mate.
22
 At 
this point however, with the increased availability to information the question became, 
“What to think about next?” In accordance with Odmar Neumann’s idea “that 
maintaining reactions, originally driven by novelty in the environment, came to be 
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initiated endogenously (from the inside), one may hypothesize that there was pressure to 
develop a more endogenous way of solving the meta-problem of what to think about 
next.”
23
 It is onto this image of a primitive and yet to some degree well-developed 
nervous system one can begin to imagine a stream of consciousness. Here Dennett 
estimates that between ten thousand and a hundred and fifty thousand years ago brain 
development began to move at an astounding pace which was never seen before. Out of 
this remarkable period of time emerged new hominids that further harnessed the plasticity 
of their brains and created an unheard of number of changes and developments in mental 
powers. The evidence of these powers is the artifacts of past civilizations: things like 
cooking, agriculture, and art. As Dennett writes, “In short, our ancestors must have 
learned some Good Tricks they could do with their adjustable hardware, which our 
species has only just begun to move, via the Baldwin effect, into the genome.”
24
 
 At this point in the story Dennett introduces a central phenomenon belonging to 
an evolutionary model of consciousness which will be of great significance at a later 
point in this thesis when I compare the logic of an evolutionary model of consciousness 
with the logic of masculine side of Jacque Lacan’s “formulae of sexuation”: that is, the 
phenomenon of “representation.”
25
 To understand what Dennett means by 
“representation” consider how a sunflower will follow the path of the sun during the day 
in order to receive a maximum amount of sunlight, however, if the sunlight is temporarily 
obscured the sunflower cannot project the new trajectory and adjust itself accordingly. 
This is to say, “the mechanism that is sensitive to the sun’s passage does not represent the 
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sun’s passage in this extended sense.”
26
 Conversely, after seeing a lion on the horizon, a 
zebra will still have a representation of the lion in its mind as it begins to run. Humans 
have an incredible capacity to represent, some of which require training (are learned) 
while others are hard-wired (are innately fixed). Dennett suggests that the sharing of 
information with the intent to learn (what he refers to as “soft-ware sharing”
27
) began 
with the development of language, or more specifically, proto-language. Through 
exchanges of grunts and squawks useful information could be shared: for example, “Run 
away!” or “Don’t eat those berries.” As members of the early groups of hominids 
communicated ideas the group recognized the benefits of sharing ideas as outweighing 
the costs and as a result communicative habits became established as normative amongst 
the community. Dennett imagines a case within the group, which he calls 
“autostimulation,”
28
 in which an individual member of the group asks for information 
when there is no one around to answer. In such an event, it is possible that the individual 
may innately have a Good Trick ready to respond to his own question, and as such, she 
learns she is capable of solving her own problems. In the same way it is possible that the 
same mental process could take place with drawing or acting. Dennett imagines an early 
hominid randomly sketching two parallel lines in the dirt of a cave; the image triggers 
something in his brain which reminds him that he needs to cross a river to get to where he 
wants to go later that day. Thus the image inspires him bring a rope when he leaves that 
afternoon. Had he not drawn the image he would not have taken the rope and having to 
have gone back to the cave for the rope when he got to the actual river he would have 
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taken longer to get where he needed to go. This process of saving time fuels new habits, 
and evolves into the ability to do “private diagram-drawing ‘in one’s mind’s eye.’”
29
 
 This image of early hominids learning to invent new paths of internal 
communication brings Dennett to the final phase of his story in the description of the 
evolution of consciousness: meme theory and cultural evolution. For Dennett, the 
development of language was one of the best Good Tricks to have ever evolved; 
however, once our brains developed the ability to use language they literally became 
parasitized by “entities that have evolved to thrive in just such a niche: memes.”
30
 
Fundamental to understanding meme theory is the fact that memes by their very nature 
obey the laws of evolution. Dennett explains that this strange idea is possible because the 
very definition of evolutionary theory “though drawn from biology, says nothing specific 
about organic molecules, nutrition, or even life.”
31
 Memes are the ideas or cultural units 
with which humans constantly engage. The wheel, a 90
o
 triangle, indie rock, 100%, the 
electric car, corn fed livestock, scrabble, Catholicism, existentialism, Halifax, differential 
calculus; these are all memes. However, b%gdo# is not a meme because it does not hold 
the ability to replicate itself with reliability and fruitfulness. Perhaps, if I were to 
construct some form of value for the cultural unit b%gdo# it could become a meme, but 
insofar as I know, as of right now b%gdo# has no value, no meaning, and thus no ability 
to replicate itself. Catholicism on the other hand is very capable of replicating itself and 
has been capable to do so for many years. In fact, under some circumstances Dennett 
would understand Catholicism to be quite a dangerous meme, because in some parts of 
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the world today, to utilize this meme may result in your persecution (in one way or 
another). In this sense, human survival is dependent to a certain extent on choosing 
memes that help us. 
 Memes travel and reproduce extremely fast. They replicate far faster than any 
genes can, and yet like genes they require certain conditions to be able to replicate. 
Things like books and monuments allow for memes to sustain themselves and grow, but 
the most ideal medium in which memes flourish is the human mind. Dennett describes 
the human mind as a “meme nest”
32
 and “the haven that all memes depend on 
reaching.”
33
 However, for Dennett, minds (like computers) are in limited supply and have 
a limited capacity (this is another important point which will be addressed in Section 1.03 
when I investigate the notion of number inherent within Dennett’s naturalized ontology). 
Thus, just like it is in the biosphere, competition for space is vicious in the memosphere. 
Furthermore, like genes, all memes “have in common the property of having phenotypic 
expressions that tend to make their own replication more likely by disabling or pre-
empting the environmental forces that would tend to extinguish them.”
34
 For example, 
Dennett describes how the meme for religious faith discourages the sort of critical 
thinking which would allow for faith to be considered a dangerous idea. Or how a 
conspiracy theory meme has an inherent objection to questioning the validity of the 
meme, that is, that the conspiracy is so powerful that it wants you to think there is no 
conspiracy. In this way memes like religious faith and conspiracy theories are able to 
invade and inhabit human minds for as long as possible. From this perspective, although 
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it is true that there is a biological foundation of genes, human consciousness is to a great 
degree the creation of the interplay and effects of memes.
35
 
It is only through the rigorous development of meme theory that Dennett can then 
put forth his final hypothesis: 
Human consciousness is itself a huge complex of memes (or more exactly, 
meme-effects in brains) that can best be understood as the operation of a 
“von Neumannesque” virtual machine implemented in the parallel 
architecture of a brain that was not designed for any such activities. The 
powers of this virtual machine vastly enhance the underlying powers of 
the organic hardware on which it runs, but at the same time many of its 
most curious features, and especially its limitations, can be explained as 
the byproducts of the kludges that make possible this curious but effective 
reuse of an existing organ for novel purposes.
36
 
To explain his hypothesis, Dennett provides an historical introduction into the 
development of the computer. Two of the key inventors involved in the development of 
the computer were Alan Turing and John Von Neumann. Despite being an accomplished 
designer and builder of electronic code-breaking machines during the Second World War, 
Turing can be considered for the most part the brains behind the Computer Age. Turing 
provided the purely abstract theoretical work that has come to be known as the Von 
Neumann Architecture, and, at least in 1991 when Dennett was writing, this structure was 
found in almost every computer in the world. 
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When Turing came up with the theoretical structure of the computer he was not 
striving to invent a word processor or video game, he was trying to think through the 
process of thinking. More specifically, he was examining the mental steps his mind 
underwent when solving mathematical problems. As Dennett explains, “[Turing] was 
thinking, self-consciously and introspectively, about just how he, a mathematician, went 
about solving mathematical problems or performing computations, and he took the 
important steps of trying to break down the sequence of his mental acts into their 
primitive components.”
37
 The result of this thought experiment yielded five basic 
components: “(1) a serial process (events happening at one time), in (2) a severely 
restricted workplace, to which (3) both data and instructions are brought (4) from an inert 
but super-reliable memory, (5) there to be operated on by a finite set of primitive 
operations.”
38
 The basic structure underlying all computer systems (again at least at the 
time when Dennett was writing Consciousness Explained, today there are alternative 
structures to Von Neumann machines
39
) owes itself to Turing. Very simply, data is 
entered into a computer’s random access memory (RAM) as binary code. Data can then 
be brought from this storage space to a place where it is accumulated, essentially waiting 
for future instruction. Using a set of primitive operations the place of instruction can then 
dictate what happens to this accumulated data: for example, it may make the instruction 
to “clear the accumulator,” or, “multiply all data by 2.” The basic primitive operations are 
the arithmetical operations (add, subtract, multiply, and divide); the data-moving 
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operations (fetch, store, output, input); and the conditional instructions (if/then 
statements). Depending on the complexity of the computer there can be as few as sixteen 
primitive operations or there may be hundreds.
40
 
Although far more efficient and far more complex than this description, Dennett 
argues that in principle the sequence of actions resulting from this architecture can be 
elaborated into all rational thought, and perhaps all irrational thought as well.
41
 Dennett is 
very confident in this claim, he writes, “We know there is something at least remotely 
like a von Neumann machine in the brain, because we know we have conscious minds 
‘by introspection’ and the minds we thereby discover are at least this much like von 
Neumann machines: they were the inspiration for von Neumann machines!”
42
 In light of 
this discovery, Dennett argues, when programming a von Neumann machine computer 
scientists have “direct access to”
43
 the process at work in the brain simply by asking, 
“What would I do if I were the machine, trying to solve this problem?”
44
 Because of this 
innate connection between the mind and the von Neumann machine, Dennett believes it 
follows that “if the brain is a massive parallel process machine, it too can be perfectly 
imitated by a von Neumann machine.”
45
 Dennett then takes these radical ideas to his final 
point, that “conscious human minds are more-or-less serial virtual machines 
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Although it is true that Dennett’s description of an evolutionary model of 
consciousness was written some twenty years ago, and even in light of the sharp criticism 
that he received and continues to receive,
47
 he remains adamant that a universal theory of 
consciousness is possible. Such struggles for universality are not out of the ordinary in 
science; for example, one need only consider the sheer magnitude of the research 
currently taking place at the CERN lab in Switzerland where contemporary physicists 
strive to, among other things, establish a theory that unifies the four fundamental forces 
of physics. In the preface to his 2005 book, Sweet Dreams, Dennett admits to not getting 
everything right in Consciousness Explained and as such he sees his new book as a 
chance for some “revision and renewal”;
48
 however, despite requiring some 
modifications, Dennett maintains that overall the theory of consciousness he presented in 
Consciousness Explained is holding up well. He writes that he is “quite certain that a 
naturalistic, mechanistic explanation of consciousness is not just possible; it is fast 
becoming actual. It will just take a lot of hard work of the sort that has being going on in 
biology all century, and in cognitive science for the last half century.”
49
 
In 1995, four years after the publication of Consciousness Explained, Dennett 
published another bestselling book entitled Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the 
Meanings of Life. If one considers Consciousness Explained to be Dennett’s universal 
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account of consciousness, then Darwin’s Dangerous Idea can be understood, at least to 
some degree, as an attempt to establish Darwin’s theory of evolution as what he terms a 
“universal acid” for dissolving all other forms of intellectual and philosophical issues.
50
 
For example, a significant section of Darwin’s Dangerous Idea is dedicated to explaining 
how the various conundrums philosophers face when engaging questions of ethics are 
clearly dissolved in the acid of evolutionary theory.
51
 To understand what Dennett means 
by this, consider how an evolutionary theory of consciousness determines “the good.” For 
Dennett, the story of the evolution of human consciousness directly corresponds to the 
many other evolutionary stories that biology tells. Dennett gives the example of how the 
mechanisms governing the evolution of sex operate in the same way as the mechanisms 
governing the evolution of consciousness. In other words, in the same way one can 
recognize the same processes at work in both the “joyless routines of reproduction” in 
oysters and the “much more exciting world of sex” in humans, one can recognize that 
although “there is nothing particularly selfy” about the consciousness of the primitive 
humans, such mechanisms “lay the foundations for our particularly human innovations 
and complications.”
52
 It follows that the fundamental nature of what humans recognize as 
good first emerges when simple primitive replicators, in order to continue to replicate, 
“hope and strive for various things.”
53
 This is to say, “they should avoid the ‘bad’ things 
and seek the ‘good’ things. When an entity arrives on the scene capable of behavior that 
                                                 
50
 Andrew Brook and Don Ross, “Dennett’s Position in the Intellectual World,” in Daniel Dennett edited by 
Andrew Brook and Don Ross (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 9. 
51
 Daniel C Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1995), 61 – 84. 
52
 Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 173. 
53
 Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 173 – 174. 
26 
 
staves off, however primitively, its own dissolution and decomposition, it brings with it 
into the world its ‘good.’”
54
 However, in contrast to the rules of say mathematics or 
physics—which Dennett accepts as being the same throughout the entire universe, a point 
that will be significant in Section 1.12 when I examine the notion of number at work in 
Dennett’s philosophy—that which is good and that which is not good do not obey 
universal laws. This is to say, for Dennett, the difficulty with the various philosophical 
fields which aim to address ethics is that there is no “feasible algorithm for the sort of 
global cost-benefit analysis that utilitarianism (or any other ‘consequentialist’ theory) 
require.”
55
 In this sense, because there is no feasible algorithm from which to derive a 
universal notion of the good it is possible to re-evaluate and alter how that which is good 
is categorized. 
Interestingly however, in Consciousness Explained Dennett argued that memes 
can be categorized into one of three categories: “good”, “controversial/ tolerable”, and 
“unquestionably pernicious,” for each of which he provided examples. For instance, 
graffiti was categorized as “unquestionably pernicious” and fast food and malls were 
categorized as “tolerable.”
56
 However, in light of Dennett’s argument in Darwin’s 
Dangerous Idea that there is no universal algorithm with which to catalog various 
memes, I am confident that today he would take no offense to a review of his claim that 
something like graffiti is “unquestionably pernicious.”
57
 Consider for example the work 
of the British spray paint artist Banksy. There is no doubt that some people consider 
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Banksy’s work to be unquestionably pernicious;
58
 however, there are also many people 
who consider Banksy to be an exciting and talented artist. For example, Banksy has sold 
a great deal of work, sometimes for large amounts of money,
59
 he has had numerous 
books and articles written in regards to his work,
60
 he directed an Oscar nominated 
documentary about street art,
61
 and he has often used art in the public spaces to address 
such difficult issues as the wall between Palestine and Israel.
62
 Clearly such accolades 
make it difficult to categorize Banksy’s work, which is clearly a form of graffiti art, as 
unquestionably pernicious. 
The idea of charity is another example of a meme which is difficult to categorize. 
Many people would consider charity to be categorized as good; however, Slavoj Žižek 
has made some interesting analyses of acts of charity which question the extent to which 
charity can be classified as good. One famous example is Žižek’s critique of the trend in 
contemporary culture for companies to donate a percentage of the cost of their item to a 
charity. Žižek’s prime example of this trend is a recent campaign on the part of the 
multinational corporation Starbucks. A few years ago, upon entering a Starbucks coffee 
shop, customers were greeted with posters informing them that a portion of the 
corporation’s profits went into health-care for sick children in Guatemala (the country 
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which was the source of Starbucks’ coffee). Of course the inference to be drawn from this 
poster was that every cup of coffee one drank helped in saving a child’s life.
63
 Now, one 
may say, what is wrong with this campaign? Is it not a good thing to help children in 
need by giving some profits to charity? But for Žižek the issue here is how the ideology 
of the campaign itself constructs a fake sense of urgency. And as Žižek notes, “There is a 
fundamental anti-theoretical edge to these urgent injunctions. There is no time to reflect: 
we have to act now. Through this fake sense of urgency, the post-industrial rich, living in 
their secluded virtual world, not only do not deny or ignore the harsh reality outside their 
area—they actively refer to it all the time.”
64
 In donating a percentage of what one pays 
to consume some product to some charitable cause, a wealthy Westerner can feel a sense 
of justice being served and as such can continue to consume believing he or she is 
actively doing something about the problem when in actuality such acts are simply 
maintaining the system itself. 
 Interestingly however, Dennett does not despair in the seemingly unavoidable 
relativism at work in categorizing the good, and as such in ethical deliberation. His 
solution to this predicament begins in first recognizing (as Žižek observes in the ideology 
at work in the campaign on the part of Starbucks) that decision making, as it takes place 
in the human agent, is inherently constrained by time: “time pressured decision making is 
all the way down.”
65
 For Dennett, this quality is simply because decision making, like 
everything else, is explained through the universal acid known as the process of 
evolution. Given these circumstances, Dennett then rightly asks, if such is the case, 
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“How, then, can we hope to regulate, or at least improve, our ethical decision making, if 
it is irremediably heuristic, time-pressured, and myopic?”
66
 Dennett’s solution for 
regulation is to posit what he terms a “conversation-stopper” within ethical deliberation.
67
 
Conversation-stoppers represent points that will terminate the possibility of philosophy 
“endlessly calling us back to first principles and demanding a justification for these 
apparently (and actually) quite arbitrary principles.”
68
 Dennett describes how 
conversation-stoppers are analogous to what we today call human rights. Referencing 
John Locke, Dennett acknowledges that “[perhaps] talk of rights is nonsense upon stilts, 
but good nonsense—and good only because it is on stilts, only because it happens to have 
the ‘political’ power to keep rising above the meta-reflections—not indefinitely, but 
usually ‘high enough’—to reassert itself as a compelling—that is, conversation-
stopping—‘first principle.’”
69
 It follows that “‘rule worship’ of a certain kind is a good 
thing, at least for agents designed like us.”
70
 Dennett imagines the good rules, the 
conversation-stoppers, being composed in a metaphorical Moral First Aid Manual, of 
which different cultures may have different manuals all depending on the audience for 
which they are intended.
71
 
In a world in which there are infinite memes competing for our attention, Dennett 
clearly recognizes the difficulty of composing such a manual. He writes, “Our prior 
problem, it seems, is that every day, while trying desperately to mind our own business, 
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we hear a thousand cries for help, complete with volumes of information on how we 
might oblige. How on Earth could anyone prioritize that cacophony? Not by any 
systematic process of considering all things, weighing expected utilities, and attempting 
to maximize. Nor by any systematic generation and testing of Kantian maxims—there are 
too many to consider.”
72
 Not surprisingly, Dennett responds to this genuine and difficult 
question by appealing to his universal acid: in accordance with the process of 
evolutionary theory we have the mind-tools required to continually redesign ourselves, 
always progressing in our search for new and better solutions to the problems we create 
for ourselves and others.
73
 This is to say, as Andrew Brook and Don Ross write, “the 
theory of evolution leaves one perfectly satisfactory approach to morality and political 
philosophy untouched, namely, traditional Western liberalism.”
74
 
In this section I explained how in starting from the perspective of primitive forms 
of life acting as self-sufficient closed wholes an evolutionary model of consciousness 
puts forth a perspective of the good as the ability to replicate, essentially to be what 
Dennett referred to as a Good Trick. In expanding upon this starting point Dennett 
logically composes a theory describing a somewhat recent period in history in which 
there was the extremely rapid development of the human mind’s ability to represent. 
Within this period a revolutionary new media which Dennett refers to as memes emerges 
and in the same way one can inherently determine the genetic perspective of the good, 
one can also determine a memetic perspective of the good. Interestingly, Dennett argues 
that one can “rely, as a general, crude rule of thumb, on the coincidence of the two 
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perspectives: by and large, the good memes are the ones that are also the good 
replicators.”
75
 From an evolutionary perspective, this coincidence must be understood as 
the natural inherent character of that which is good. As I explained, this is indeed how 
Dennett understands the task of contemporary ethics, for in accordance with the process 
of evolutionary theory humanity has evolved the mind-tools required to continually 
redesign itself, always progressing in its search for solutions to the problems it creates for 
itself and other forms of living things.
76
 From this perspective, not only is the good 
reduced to a result of material processes, but it also rejects the notion of an independently 
existing self. As strange and as frightening as Dennett realizes this sounds, he sums it up 
as follows: “The ‘independent’ mind struggling to protect itself from alien and dangerous 
memes is a myth; there is, in the basement, a persisting tension between the biological 
imperative of the genes and the imperatives of the memes, but we would be foolish to 
‘side with’ our genes—that is to commit the most egregious error of pop sociobiology.”
77
 
Dennett proceeds by asking the necessary and critical questions to follow such a 
naturalist view of the world, “What foundation, then, can we stand on as we struggle to 
keep our feet in the memestorm in which we are engulfed? If replicative might does not 
make it right, what is to be the eternal ideal relative to which ‘we’ will judge the value of 
memes?”
78
 Interestingly, he provides but a one sentence response to these most 
complicated questions: “We should note that the memes for normative concepts—for 
ought and good and truth and beauty—are among the most entrenched denizens of our 
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minds, and that among the memes that constitute us, they play a central role. Our 
existence as us, as what we as thinkers are—not as what we as organisms are—is not 
independent of these memes.”
79
 Human rights, or conversation-stoppers, are indeed 
memes, but they are also inherently that which is good in the world right now. 
Whether or not one agrees with Dennett that the good is some-thing located deep 
down in the mind, a natural altruistic sense, is not the point I am intending to argue in this 
thesis. As I have noted, in the years following the publications of Consciousness 
Explained and Darwin’s Dangerous Idea many critiques of Dennett’s philosophy have 
been made and continue to be made. The critiques have come from many different 
perspectives; for example, from Paul Churchland—who critiques Dennett, but not with 
the intention of denying the computer structure of the brain, but rather to argue that a 
different structure than the von Neumann machine is necessary for its description and 
subsequent construction
80
—to the recent work by Conor Cunningham—who critiques 
Dennett with the intention of, among other things, exposing how Dennett has no 
understanding of the nature of belief, and that ultimately, it is nihilistic to turn 
evolutionary theory into a theory of everything.
81
 This being said, not only is it beyond 
the scope of this thesis to get into the depths of these various critiques, it is not the 
interest of this thesis either. Rather, in this thesis I present Dennett’s position with the 
intention of establishing how it fits within the Badiouian category of a thinking of the 
One. To do so, in what follows I describe two fundamental elements necessary for 
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Dennett’s positivist ontology to operate. Specifically, in Section 1.01 I explain how, like 
Western liberal democratic capitalism, Dennett’s positivist philosophy needs to be 
understood as a natural progression, and then in Section 1.02 I explain how, again like 
Western liberal democratic capitalism, Dennett’s philosophy requires the necessity of 
positing an abstraction by which to engage with real world societal relations. After doing 
so I then, in Section 1.03, move into a discussion of the understanding of number which 
underlies these two fundamental logical elements; the form of number which Badiou 
identifies as belonging to the reign of Capital, “the unthought slavery of numericality 
itself.”
82
 After having established these two fundamental logical elements at work in 
Dennett’s philosophy and the underlying notion of number within which they operate, I 
am then in a position to describe how Radical Orthodoxy, a movement which clearly 
aims to confirm a true Christian ontology, operates in accordance with the same two 
logical elements I identified in the philosophy of Dennett and as such, like Dennett’s 
philosophy, how the theological project of Radical Orthodoxy is also representative a 
Badiouian thinking of the One. 
 
1.01 Evolutionary progression 
 
Very early in his book, The Fragile Absolute, Slavoj Žižek identifies the idea of a natural 
altruism inherent to human beings as a fundamental element of contemporary capitalist 
ideology. Žižek writes 
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we still silently assume that the liberal democratic capitalist global order is 
somehow the finally found ‘natural’ social regime; we still implicitly 
conceive of conflicts in Third World countries as a subspecies of natural 
catastrophes, as outbursts of quasi-natural violent passions, or as conflicts 
based on fanatical identification with ethnic roots (and what is ‘ethnic’ 
here if not again a codeword for nature?). And, again, the key point is that 
this all-pervasive renaturalization is strictly correlative to the global 
reflexivization of our daily lives.
83
 
At first Žižek’s statement here may seem exaggerated, however, read in parallel with 
what David Bentley Hart describes in his book, The Atheist Delusions, as the “simple and 
enchanting tale”
84
 of human freedom which has come to achieve canonical status in 
Western culture it does not seem so inappropriate. Hart’s story (which is worth quoting in 
full) goes, 
Once upon a time Western humanity was the cosseted and incurious ward 
of Mother Church; during this, the age of faith, culture stagnated, science 
languished, wars of religion were routinely waged, witches were burned 
by inquisitors, and Western humanity labored in brutish subjugation to 
dogma, superstition, and the unholy alliance of church and state. 
Withering blasts of fanaticism and fideism had long since scorched away 
the last remnants of classical learning; inquiry was stifled; the literary 
remains of classical antiquity had long ago been consigned to the fires of 
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faith, and even the great achievements of 'Greek science' were forgotten 
until Islamic civilization restored them to the West. All was darkness. 
Then, in the wake of the ‘wars of religion’ that had torn Christendom 
apart, came the full flowering of the Enlightenment and with it the reign of 
reason and progress, the riches of scientific achievement and political 
liberty, and a new and revolutionary sense of human dignity. The secular 
nation-state arose, reduced religion to an establishment of the state, and 
thereby rescued Western humanity from the blood-steeped intolerance of 
religion. Now, at last, Western humanity has left its nonage and attained 
its majority, in science, politics, and ethics. The story of the travails of 
Galileo almost invariably occupies an honored place in this narrative, as 
exemplary of the natural relation between ‘faith’ and ‘reason’ and as an 
exquisite epitome of scientific reason’s mighty struggle during the early 
modern period to free itself from the tyranny of religion.
85
 
The fact that Hart then goes to great lengths to prove this story wrong is not my point in 
quoting him here. Neither is it my point that the story is, but rather, that it is the story of 
how we came to arrive in late modernity.
86
 For it is precisely this detail which Žižek is 
getting at when he writes, “we still silently assume that the liberal democratic capitalist 
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global order is somehow the finally found ‘natural’ social regime.”
87
 In late modernity, 
altruism, like violent conflict, is understood to have emerged or evolved from the natural 
order of things (as described by Hart’s “simple and enchanting tale”), but for the person 
who ascribes to a liberal democratic way of life, altruism must be somehow more natural, 
the finally found way of life discovered by Westerners. Indeed, this is a remarkably 
controversial statement, one which most liberal Westerners (at least one would hope) 
would most likely shy away from considering too seriously. For how could anyone 
genuinely believe that the wars in the Congo
88
 or the genocide in Rwanda
89
 was a 
“subspecies” of the earthquake that destroyed Haiti
90
 or the Tsunami that flattened 
Indonesia?
91
 And yet, this is precisely the logic by which an evolutionary description of 
consciousness portrays. Again, my intention here is not to critique such a description of 
reality, rather, in regards to Dennett’s evolutionary notion of consciousness Žižek rightly 
observes that if a good idea (a good meme) is a result of natural evolutionary processes 
that, as Dennett suggests, coincidentally coincides with the ability to replicate,
92
 then 
violence in the name of any movement (Dennett would call it a violent meme) must be by 
definition a subspecies of the violence that takes place during an earthquake or tsunami 
(violence that occurs in a world without consciousness, a world without reason, only 
causes). For in Dennett’s evolutionary model of consciousness, as I discussed at length in 
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the previous section of this thesis, consciousness is understood to have emerged from a 
world in which there was no consciousness. In other words, the prime medium within 
which memes function, that is the human mind, is a subspecies of the medium in which 
natural disasters occur, that is the material world. In this way Dennett’s philosophy 
corresponds perfectly with Hart’s “simple and enchanting tale”—the dominant story of 
how we arrived in late modernity—and as such is in full agreement with Žižek’s 
argument that contemporary capitalist ideology “still silently [assumes] that the liberal 
democratic capitalist global order is somehow the finally found ‘natural’ social regime”,
93
 
and thus, both Western liberal democratic capitalism and an evolutionary model of 
consciousness need to be understood as “natural” progressions 
 
1.02  Positing an abstraction: Dennett’s Universal Acid 
 
As discussed Section in 1.0, for Dennett, the means to weeding out the violent memes 
causing all the strife in the developing
94
 world is to compose a list of conversation-
stoppers in a metaphorical Moral First Aid Manual. In reality however this manual is not 
a metaphor insofar as groups such as the United Nations spend a great deal of time and 
energy composing large documents aiming to establish such conversation-stoppers; or, in 
other words, to establish something called human rights. Early in the first chapter of 
Ethics Alain Badiou observes precisely this when he writes: “In the political domain […] 
many intellectuals, along with much of public opinion, have been won over to the logic 
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of a capitalist economy and a parliamentary democracy. […] Rather than seek out the 
terms of a new politics of collective liberation, they have, in sum, adopted as their own 




 one of the founding 
elements of capitalist ideology in late modernity is the positing of “a universally 
recognizable human subject possessing ‘rights’ that are in some sense natural: the right to 
live, to avoid abusive treatment, to enjoy ‘fundamental’ liberties.”
97
 This is to say, 
according to Badiou, capitalist logic contains an inherent image, or an idealized 
abstraction, of a “human.” This “human” has certain characteristics: she or he has shelter, 
food, love, etc. The further a person is from corresponding to this form, the more he or 
she is a victim. As discussed in Section 1.0, for Dennett the idea of human rights is the 
foundation for the mind’s ability to perform ethical discernment amongst the plurality of 
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memes competing for our attention. In positing rights as first-principle humanity is 
capable of establishing a point in which endless philosophizing must cease and real-life 
decisions must be made, what Dennett refers to as the conversation-stopper. In this 
approach to ethical discernment Badiou rightly identifies an a priori ability to discern 
Evil.
98
 By positing a universal human subject/abstraction—one whose central quality is 
“he who suffers” or “he who identifies suffering”—the good by definition must be 
derived from evil and not vice versa. As Badiou observes, “‘[h]uman rights’ are rights to 
non-Evil.”
99
 As a result of this process, man becomes “the being who is capable of 
recognizing himself as a victim.”
100
 And for Badiou, what is most impressive is that like 
Hart’s “simple and enchanting tale” the power of this doctrine rests, at first glance, in its 
self evidence.
101
 It is precisely this self-evidence that Dennett confirms when he describes 
the good memes as existing in the “entrenched denizens of our minds.”
102
 
Žižek puts a slight twist on Badiou’s recognition that in the contemporary context 
in order for the good to function the individual must posit a universal human abstraction. 
For Žižek it is not simply a human abstraction that comes to establish the good, but 
furthermore one must also posit an abstraction of a True-reality in which societal 
relations take place. To understand what Žižek means by this, first consider Karl Marx’s 
description of capitalist reality in The Communist Manifesto 
The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the 
instruments of production and thereby the relations of production, and 
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with them the whole relations of a society. […]  The need of a constantly 
expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole 




In the contemporary context, what I have been referring to as late modernity, to be in 
relationship with the world is to be in relationship with capitalism.
104
 Such a relationship 
is by no means optional, it is fundamental to being in-itself. This is to say, capitalism has 
the unique ability to be simultaneously everywhere and nowhere at the same time. As 
Levi Bryant points out, it is not possible to point at a particular site and be capable of 
identifying “capitalism” in the same way one could point to and identify an object such as 
“Barack Obama” or an “ice cream sandwich.” Bryant argues, capitalism “pervades every 
aspect of contemporary life, while nonetheless being absolutely non-localizable.”
105
 For 
Bryant, contemporary capitalism is an example of what Tim Morton refers to as 
hyperobjects. As Morton describes, 
hyperobjects are viscous—they adhere to you no matter how hard to try to 
pull away, rendering ironic distance obsolete. Now I’ll argue that they are 
also nonlocal. That is, hyperobjects are massively distributed in time and 
space such that any particular (local) manifestation never reveals the 
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totality of the hyperobject. When you feel raindrops falling on your head, 
you are experiencing climate, in some sense. In particular you are 
experiencing the climate change known as global warming. But you are 
never directly experiencing global warming as such. Nowhere in the long 
list of catastrophic weather events—which will increase as global 
warming takes off—will you find global warming.
106
 
If capitalism by its very nature
107
 forces society to function in relationship with it—that is 
in terms of being qua Capital—then a new reality results.  Marx aptly describes the 
consequences of this shift in reality: “All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of 
ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are all swept away, all new-formed ones 
become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is 
profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real condition in life, 
and his relations with his kind.”
108
 It is for precisely this same line of reasoning that when 
asked what advice he had for those involved in the Occupy movement who were looking 
for new tactics, McKenzie Wark replied, “There is power in the image of people together. 
And of course people who do these things learn a lot and some will become comrades for 
life. (Some of course, will never speak to each other again!) But the problem is: How can 
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To understand what Wark implies by the problem of how to occupy an 
abstraction, consider the following example: in late June 2011 a multitude of diverse 
individuals descended upon the city of Toronto, Canada. The event motivating the 
crowd’s arrival in the city was the same, a meeting of the world’s top twenty industrial 
nations known as the G20. World leaders met in a heavily fortified section of downtown 
Toronto.  Behind barricades their discussions revealed a lack of consensus in regards to a 
means of recovery from the global recession.
111
 Police officers armed in riot gear rode 
horses and bicycles about the streets. Vocal protestors shouted slogans of resistance while 
being photographed by news stations and fellow revolutionaries. A violent few broke 
windows and burned cars. It was estimated that by the end of the weekend over nine 
hundred protestors had been arrested by the police.
112
 It would seem obvious to suggest 
that there were conflicting beliefs among those gathered in Toronto; however, in essence 
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this is not the case.
113
 In other words, the beliefs of those gathered in Toronto, from the 
poorest radical to the wealthiest world leader, were not in direct opposition to each other, 
rather, they shared a common foundation: the necessary obstacle, or abstraction, of 




The obvious question here is how can two conflicting groups, such as the world 
leaders and the protestors, share a common foundation to their belief structures? Consider 
how on the one hand, both the protestors and the world leaders feel that reality (the way 
things presently are) is not as it should be, that there is an obstacle in the way of True-
reality (the way things should be). Perhaps the protestors understood the obstacle to be 
such things as environmental policy or human rights.  Perhaps the world leaders 
understood the obstacle to be a faltering economy or trade regulations. In both these 
cases, if one group could achieve, possess and transmit
115
 the correct knowledge (be it by 
means of science, economics, law, human rights or some other form of academic logic), 
then society could overcome the obstacle and achieve True-reality: be it economic 
stability, environmental stability, legal justice, or whatever. Both groups assumed there is 
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a True-reality which should be possible if only one was to direct capital in the right way. 
As such, both the protestors and the leaders were operating in accordance with what 
Žižek describes as “a strictly ideological fantasy of maintaining the thrust towards 
productivity generated by capitalism, while getting rid of the ‘obstacles’ and antagonisms 
that were – as the sad experience of ‘actually existing capitalism’ demonstrates – the only 




The basis of Žižek’s critique here comes from his understanding that for Georg 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel the central issue of ontology is not that of reality, but rather that 
of appearance. This distinction is central to understanding how the logic involved in an 
evolutionary model of consciousness runs parallel to capitalist ideology in late modernity. 
Žižek argues that Hegel distinguished between the inquiry of (a) how it is possible to sift 
through the plethora of appearances to arrive at an underlying reality, and, (b) the 
mystery of how appearances are able to emerge.
117
 For Žižek, this distinction allowed 
Hegel to disregard what he interpreted as the fruitless search for a single unknown event 
to which all other events are measured relative to. This is to say, this distinction renders 
useless the task of speculating on the nature of primitive replicators in order to relatively 
measure the state of a contemporary good. Or, in the case of the protestors and the 
bankers, the uselessness of the task of speculating on the nature of how capital should be 
directed in order to obtain one’s understanding of a True-reality. Žižek argues that for 
Hegel, “Universality is not merely the universal core that animates a series of its 
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particular forms of appearance; it persists in the very irreducible tension, noncoincidence, 
between these different levels.”
118
 This noncoincidence between different forms of 
appearances, or representations, is in direct contrast to Dennett’s universal acid that is the 
evolutionary notion of the good, in which, as I described in Section 1.0, the good is 
founded upon the coincidence of the fact that the good memes are the also the memes that 
have a strong ability to replicate. Žižek insists that it is precisely this philosophy of 
universality, that which posits a universal abstraction to which all other ideas (or memes) 
are measure relative to, which maintains the capitalist order in late modernity. 
Žižek utilizes Jacque Lacan’s “formulae of sexuation” to further explain this 
phenomenon.
119
 Lacan understands there to be two means by which one may engage the 
world, a masculine logic and a feminine logic. For example, Žižek argues both 
communism and capitalism operate within logic of the masculine side, as opposed to the 
feminine side, of the “formulae of sexuation” because both capitalism and communism 
enforce capital as the universal core necessary in order to establish their separate 
ideological structures. The universal core acts as an exception which constitutes the 
universal as transcendent universal and all other particulars are forced into the realm in 
which this operates. This has significant consequences, within the masculine side all that 
is must be knowable in relation to the universal core; therefore, for example, if capital is 
the universal core then all that is is that which can be known in relationship to capital. In 
this sense, like with the protestors and the bankers, at their root there is no difference 
between communism and capitalism insofar as they both understand being in relation to 
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the universal core known as “capital.” The alternative to the masculine side is the 
feminine side; however, as Žižek maintains, the two sides are not symmetrical opposites, 
rather the feminine side has priority. The feminine side advocates a logic which refuses 
the notion of a closed system. All that is, only is insofar as it is revealed to the individual 
by way of the symbolic order, and because it is not everything that is, it is pas-tout. In 
establishing a pas-tout, a non-whole, there is understood to be an absence of a static 
exception or universal core. The pas-tout operates within the what is and reflects the logic 
of the what is, but society can never fully correspond to or overtake the what is, yet the 
what is is operative everywhere in society undermining and distorting it.
120
 This 
distinction, between the masculine and feminine sides of the formulae of sexuation, will 
be essential in Section 1.12 when I engage the question of how Radical Orthodoxy 
addresses the logical demand that thought must posit a True-reality by which to engage 
the world. 
 
1.03  Number: A closed whole 
 
The title of the introductory chapter to Alain Badiou’s book, Number and Numbers, can 
in one sense be considered the foundational maxim for his entire philosophy: “Number 
Must Be Thought.”
121
 It is important to bear in mind that Badiou does not make this 
statement as a scientist, but as a philosopher. This is to say, in claiming that number must 
be thought Badiou is not implying that truth is that which can be empirically verified. On 
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the contrary, for Badiou mathematics, the notion of number which we are historically 
given, dictates the ability to speak of being qua being: summarized in the quasi-formula, 
“mathematics = ontology.”
122
 Indeed, this strange condition produces a fascinating 
paradox, as Badiou writes, “we live in the era of number’s despotism; thought yields to 
the law of denumerable multiplicities; and yet […] we have at our disposal no recent, 
active idea of what number is.”
123
 However, despite having no active idea of what 
number is, there is a notion of number which governs our conception of all things 
ontological: the political, the human-sciences, cultural representations, the economy, our 
souls.
124
 Furthermore, similarly to how Phillip Goodchild remarks “There is but a single 
ontological problem, ‘What is money?’”
125
 Badiou argues that the dominant 
understanding of number in late modernity, and as such the dominant ontological 
structure, is dictated by capital. For Badiou, capital’s ontological oppression can be 
challenged by first contemplating the dominant notion of number active in our minds and 
then subsequently striving to challenge that very understanding. Badiou writes, 
In our situation, that of Capital, the reign of number is thus the reign of the 
unthought slavery of numericality itself. Number, which, so it is claimed, 
underlies everything of value, is in actual fact a proscription against any 
thinking of number itself. Number operates as that obscure point where the 
situation concentrates its law; obscure through its being at once sovereign 
                                                 
122
 Alain Badiou, Briefings on Existence: A Short Treatise on Transitory Ontology (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 2006), 59. 
123
 Badiou, Number and Numbers, 1. 
124
 Badiou, Number and Numbers, 1 – 4. 
125
 Goodchild, “Capital and Kingdom,” 130. 
48 
 
and subtracted from all thought, and even from every investigation that 
orients itself toward some truth.
126
 
This section of my thesis addresses both the form of number Badiou understands as 
governing capital—“the unthought slavery of numericality itself,” what I have been 
calling a thinking of the One—and the form of number that Badiou understands as 
providing the foundation for liberation from capitalist notions of number, namely, a 
Cantorian understanding of number. Furthermore, I will show how the form of number 
governing capital is the same form of number which governs Dennett’s naturalized 
ontology. After doing so I am then in a position to establish the extent to which Radical 
Orthodoxy also operates in accordance with this understanding of number in Section 
1.13. 
To begin to discern Badiou’s maxim “number must be thought,” consider how in 
his book, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, Badiou aims to expose the 
axioms at work in the thought governing a contemporary ethics of difference. The idea of 
difference is a key concept within Badiou’s philosophical system, one which he argues 
will operate differently depending on our understanding of number. In clarifying such 
axioms Badiou believes one can to a certain extent rationally discern and ultimately 
decide upon the orientation of one’s thought, and more specifically, the form of number 
operational in how one thinks difference. Such intentions do not imply that Badiou, like 
Dennett, believes the mind to be precisely like that of a computer—a self-contained 
whole capable of being completely reprogrammed at will—rather, in discerning the 
foundations of how we think of a concept like difference we can engage in a process 
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where self-transformation is possible. This is to say, in investigating and subsequently 
processing the ideas at work in our minds we are capable of discerning truth, what 
Badiou will call truth-procedures.
127
 
To begin his investigation of the thought governing a contemporary ethics of 
difference, Badiou locates in Emmanuel Levinas an approach to thinking “which has 
thrown off its ‘logical’ chains (the principle of identity) in favour of its prophetic 
submission to the Law of founding alterity.”
128
 This is to say, the Greek notion that 
“adequate action presumes an initial theoretical mastery of experience, which ensures that 
the action is in conformity with the rationality of being”
129
 is replaced by the Jewish 
notion that “everything is grounded in the immediacy of an opening to the Other which 
disarms the reflexive subject.”
130
 In this philosophical framework, presence (or 
experience) takes precedence over reflexivity (or, rational reflection). For Levinas, the 
central way in which one is capable of opening one’s-self to the presence of the Other is 
through the face. This does not imply that one literally sees the Other in the face of 
another person, rather, through the face of the Other one sees one’s-self reflected.  It is 
one’s adherence to this process of seeing one’s-self reflected in the face which makes 
manifest the Other. Badiou writes: “Through his fleshy epiphany […] is that from which 
I experience myself ethically as ‘pledged’ to the appearing of the Other, and subordinated 
in my being to this pledge.”
131
 In other words, to look into a face and see the potential for 
how things could be for me (I could be the one who is starving in Haiti, I could be the 
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one in the earthquake zone in Japan, I could have been born into the political strife in 
Libya) is essentially to see myself reflected in that face, or more specifically it is to 
objectify myself.  But to think according to this logic “requires that the experience of 
alterity be ontologically ‘guaranteed’ as the experience of a distance, or of an essential 
non-identity, the traversal of which is the ethical experience itself.”
132
  To see myself in 
the face of a victim (the starving child in Haiti, the homeless mother in Japan, the 
murdered rebel in Libya) requires me to ground my being in the Being of an Altogether-
Other (or, perhaps we could say to ground my being in the Being of a transcendent god). 
From these observations Badiou concludes that there is a principle of alterity which 
governs an ethics of difference: “a pious discourse without piety.”
133
 And in this 
philosophical framework, ethics becomes the new name for thought. 
At this point one may ask: What is the philosophical problem with grounding my 
being in the being of an Altogether-Other, or, with ethics becoming the new name for 
thought?  For Badiou the problem is that this philosophical framework breeds an 
ideology founded upon the concept of tolerance. Thought based in tolerance inherently 
demands a competition between two opposites: “between ‘tolerance’ and ‘fanaticism’, 
between ‘the ethics of difference’ and ‘racism’, between ‘recognition of the other’ and 
‘identitarian’ [(or, ‘ontological’)] fixity.”
134
 Ironically, this idea of the respect for 
differences reduces to a violent demand of same-ness: I respect your difference only 
insofar as you are guided by the central axiom, True-reality, or abstraction: “Respect my 
difference.” As Badiou writes, “The problem is that the ‘respect for differences’ and the 
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ethics of human rights do seem to define an identity!  And that as a result, the respect for 
differences applies only to those differences that are reasonably consistent with this 
identity.”
135
 This identity is something that Dennett is both very well aware and very 
supportive of, as evidenced by the fact that one of the goals of Darwin’s Dangerous Idea 
was to establish that “the theory of evolution leaves one perfectly satisfactory approach to 
morality and political philosophy, namely, traditional Western liberalism.”
136
 
Badiou wants to challenge the reality of this identity—that is traditional Western 
liberalism as the normative philosophical position—by arguing that far from being a self-
sustained closed whole brought into relationship with the other via the tolerance of 
difference, reality is rather inherently incomplete; and furthermore, that truth is given, 
from nothing, in the form of an event. He argues that it in challenging contemporary 
conceptions of number such a feat is possible. Badiou writes 
genuine thought should affirm the following principle: since differences 
are what there is, and since every truth is the coming-to-be of that which is 
not yet, so differences are then precisely what truths depose, or render 
insignificant. No light is shed on any concrete situation by the notion of 
the ‘recognition of the other’.  Every modern collective configuration 
involves people from everywhere, who have their different ways of eating 
and speaking, who wear different sorts of headgear, follow different 
                                                 
135
 Badiou, Ethics, 24. 
136
 Brook and Ross, “Dennett’s Position in the Intellectual World,” 9. 
52 
 
religions, have complex and varied relations to sexuality, prefer authority 
or disorder, and such is the way of the world.
137
 
If difference is simply what there is, then the task of identifying with difference is 
useless.  In this sense the true task is not “recognizing the other” but rather “recognizing 
the same.”
138
  Here we see the beginnings of how Badiou characterizes truth, he writes, “I 
have already named that in regard to which only the advent of the Same occurs: it is a 
truth.  Only a truth is, as such, indifferent to differences.  This is something we have 
always known, even if sophists of every age have always attempted to obscure its 
certainty: a truth is the same for all.”
139
 
To understand what Badiou means by a truth being “the same for all” and “the 
coming-to-be of that which is not yet,” consider what Badiou says of difference in 
relation to love. Badiou argues that 
In today’s world it is generally thought that individuals only pursue their 
own self-interest. Love is an antidote to that. Provided it isn’t conceived 
only as an exchange of mutual favours, or isn’t calculated way in advance 
as a profitable investment, love really is a unique trust placed in chance. It 
takes us into key areas of the experience of what is difference and, 
essentially, leads to the idea that you can experience the world from the 
perspective of difference. In this respect it has universal implications: it is 
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an individual experience of potential universality, and is thus central to 
philosophy, as Plato was the first to intuit.
140
 
What Badiou refers to here as the “perspective of difference” is radically distinct from the 
“respect for difference” he critiques in Ethics. Love asks the question, what kind of world 
does one see when it is experienced from the point of view of the two and not one? What 
is the world like when it is experienced from the point of view of difference and not 
identity?
141
 Not merely thinking “I could be that victim, or that victim, or that victim…” 
but an incomprehensible devotion to a unique and individual process of saying “yes” to 
an event, a radical rupture, over and over again. In Meditation 31 of Being and Event 
Badiou describes this as “a generic procedure of fidelity;”
142
 science operates in similar 
way to love, but rather than being a procedure within the individual situation, “because 
[love] interests no-one apart from the individuals in question,”
143
 science takes place in a 




It is in this sense that Dennett understands his naturalized ontology as operating in 
accordance with the work of Friedrich Nietzsche. (Whether or not he is right to do so is 
not my concern, rather my concern is only in how Dennett reads Nietzsche.) This is to 
say, Dennett accepts that although Nietzsche’s philosophy has individual means, the 
transmission of the effects from his philosophy concern Darwinian Theory in general. It 
is for this reason that in Darwin’s Dangerous Idea Dennett places Nietzsche next to 
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Thomas Hobbes as the second greatest sociobiologist to have every lived.
145
 Despite not 
being convinced that Nietzsche ever really read any of Darwin’s work, Dennett 
recognizes that many aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy, in particular his notion of eternal 
recurrence, has resonances with Darwinism. Dennett rightly celebrates Nietzsche’s 
criticism of the Social Darwinists working in the late nineteenth century. For the Social 
Darwinists, “it is ‘natural’ for the strong to vanquish the weak, and for the rich to exploit 
the poor.”
146
 Dennett argues that this is an incorrect usage of Darwinian thought because 
it fails to distinguish between the biological genes and the cultural memes that compose 
human beings. Dennett writes, 
We, unlike the cells that compose us, are not on ballistic trajectories; we 
are guided missiles, capable of altering course at any point, abandoning 
goals, switching allegiances, forming cabals and then betraying them, and 
so forth. For us, it is always decision time, and because we live in a world 
of memes, no consideration is alien to us, or a foregone conclusion.[
147
] 
For this reason, we are constantly faced with social opportunities and 
dilemmas of the sort for which game theory provides the playing field and 
the rules of engagement but not the solutions. Any theory of the birth of 
ethics is going to have to integrate culture with biology.
148
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Dennett rightly observes how Nietzsche too was working in accordance with the idea that 
any theory of the birth of ethics is going to have to integrate culture with biology. He 
quotes from the second of the three essays that make up Nietzsche’s Genealogy: “To 
breed an animal with the right to make promises—is not this the paradoxical task that 
nature has set itself in the case of man? Is it not the real problem regarding man?”
149
 By 
performing an imaginative investigation of what Dennett calls “the fossil record of 
human culture, in the form of ancient myths, surviving religious practices, archeological 
clues, and so forth”
150
 Nietzsche composed a story of early humans in transition from a 
world in which there were no memetic alliances to a world in which there were. It is not 
the kind of story that most people would find pleasant: early humans had to literally 
torture each other into developing a special form of memory which would be capable of 
keeping track of credits and debts. In this way organizations and alliances were be made; 
cheaters were remembered and punishments were held. Again quoting Nietzsche, “Its 
beginnings were, like the beginnings of everything great on earth, soaked in blood 
thoroughly and for a long time.”
151
 
 The formation of these early societies did not immediately generate a moral 
world. According to Nietzsche’s story, a second transition occurs: from a pre-moral 
world with alliances to a moral world. In the pre-moral societies the proto-citizens had 
notions of good and bad, but not good and evil or right and wrong.
152
 Fascinatingly, 
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Nietzsche speculates that the birth of morals comes when the memes
153
 for good and bad 
in the pre-moral world actually trade places: the good memes in the pre-moral world 
become the evil memes and the moral world, and the bad memes in the pre-moral world 
become the good memes in the moral world. For example, the lust that was once a 
“good” thing insofar as it encourages the proto-citizen to copulate and grow the 
population of the society becomes an “evil” thing that must be brought under control. As 
described in Matthew 20: 16, “So the last will be first, and the first will be last.” Thus 
begins the slave revolt inspired by the priests. Nietzsche writes, 
For the priests everything becomes more dangerous, not only cures and 
remedies, but also arrogance, revenge, acuteness, profligacy, love, lust to 
rule, virtue, disease—but it is only fair to add that it was on the soil of this 
essentially dangerous form of human existence, the priestly form, that 
man first became an interesting animal, that only here did the human soul 
in a higher sense acquire depth and become evil—and these are the two 
basic respects in which man has hitherto been superior to other beasts!
154
 
In light of this vision of reality Dennett understands that, “The task facing us is still the 
task that faced Hobbes and Nietzsche: somehow we have to have evolved into beings that 
can have a conscience, as Nietzsche says (1885, epigram 98), that kisses us while it hurts 
us.”
155
 This point inspires Dennett to imagine things such as an “articifical selector of 
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 not unlike a dog or cattle breeder who observes the herd and notes 
which ones were nice, and then goes to great  lengths to make sure the nice ones breed. 
“In due course, you ought to be able to evolve a population of nice people—supposing 
that a tendency to niceness could be represented somehow in the genome.”
157
 Amidst 
such controversial reasoning, Dennett concludes with yet another challenging question 
followed by yet another brief response: “Is something sacred? Yes, say I with Nietzsche. 
I could not pray to it, but I can stand in affirmation of its magnificence. This world is 
sacred.”
158
 Or, equivalently, the world is One. 
In contrast to Dennett’s Nietzsche, Badiou’s reading of Nietzschean thought 
begins with positing the figure of Nietzsche not as a scientist, historian or philosopher, 
but as an anti-philosopher. For Badiou, this is a move to be celebrated, in a sense, and not 
deemed unbecoming, for it identifies Nietzsche’s mission to make known “an act without 
precedent, an act that will in fact destroy philosophy.”
159
 Badiou believes this type of act 
deserves our greatest attention. Nietzsche’s central impact is not, as Dennett argues, in 
announcing that the world is “sacred” or a “magnificent” thing, but rather in proclaiming 
an act, or event, which is announced before it is produced: Nietzsche deserves our 
attention in that he is his “own forerunner, [his] own cock-crow through dark lanes.”
160
 
Nietzsche is the greatest kind of criminal, and it is precisely this form of criminal, the 
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anti-philosopher, that is central to Badiou’s project:
161
 his rethinking of number in 
response to the conditioning of capitalist notions of number. 
But how exactly does Badiou understand Nietzsche, the anti-philosopher, as 
offering a different perspective of number, distinct from Dennett’s Nietzsche who affirms 
the world is One? In fact, to the Nietzschean scholar this claim would perhaps seem 
ridiculous, for it could be argued that Nietzschean semiotics are so radically against the 
existence of static meaning that even the notion of “number” is essentially empty, but one 
more way of attempting to implement stasis upon the world. In the first two chapters of 
his book, Nietzsche and Theology, David Deane illustrates how “Nietzschean interpreters, 
while attempting to straighten Nietzschean contradiction, manifest a different 
understanding of sign and self than that which frames Nietzsche’s texts.”
162
 As Deane 
explains, the notion of contradiction by its very nature requires a set understanding of the 
relationship between the self and sign. Thus the moment one indicates a contradiction one 
is already revealing the logic by which one’s philosophical framework operates. With this 
clever observation Deane is then capable of describing “a semiotic understanding more in 
keeping with that held by Nietzsche and within which his contradiction comes to 
function. From illustrating this understanding of the relationship between self and sign, 
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the nature of Nietzsche’s self contradiction can come into clearer focus.”
163
 What Deane 
argues 
is not that Nietzsche is not guilty of contradiction, but that Nietzsche’s 
understanding of logic, and the words that structure and mediate it, is 
different from ours, and that we must attempt to understand Nietzschean 
‘contradiction’ in terms of this ‘Nietzschean’ logic too, in order to see it in 
a more comprehensive perspective. This perspective, [Deane argues], is 
vital, as only in this perspective can we reach a truly comprehensive 
understanding of Nietzschean thought.
164
 
Interestingly, the exact same failure Deane locates the work of such Nietzschean scholars 
as Danto and Schacht (through a grueling discussion of the “signature” apropos Derrida), 
Badiou locates in Deleuze: “What is lost in Deleuze’s strong reading is this: it is through 
the opacity of the proper name that Nietzsche constructs his own category of truth. This is 
indeed what assigns the vital act to its nonsensical, or invaluable, dimension. Nietzsche’s 
last word is not sense, but the inevaluable.”
165
 
But while Deane rightly notices that Nietzsche’s interpreters fail to straighten 
Nietzsche’s philosophy because operating within their own philosophical frameworks 
(founded upon the concept of non-contraction) they fall victim to Nietzschean critique of 
systems in general, Deane fails to acknowledge that Nietzsche’s ontology—as according 
to Badiou any ontology must—posits its very own presupposition into the nature of 
number, namely, it posits the existence of the One only to then proclaim a future event 
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which will “destroy philosophy” or destroy this particular One. To understand what I 
mean by this consider how for Badiou, “[to] enter into Nietzsche, one must […] focus on 
the point where evaluation, values, and all sense all come to falter in the trial posed by 
the act. Thus where it is no longer a question of values or of sense, but of what actively 
surpasses them, what philosophy has always named ‘truth’.”
166
 Nietzsche is not 
attempting to overcome anything. The anti-philosophical act is not an overcoming, rather 
the act is an event. An event which in its opacity is an absolute break without program or 
concept, but nonetheless known by the proper name, “Nietzsche.”
167
 Badiou references 
two terrifying quotes: “I am strong enough to break up the history of man in two. (Letter 
to Strindberg of the 8
th
 of December 1888)” and “I conceive the philosopher as a 
terrifying explosive that puts the entire world in danger. (Ecce Homo)”
168
 But 
interestingly, in proclaiming the event prior to its arrival, Nietzsche becomes caught in a 
circle, an oscillation in which the announcement of the event (of which Badiou provides 
numerous examples
169
) becomes indiscernible from the event itself. “Since [this circle] 
does not have the event as its condition, since it grasps it—or claims to grasp it—in the 
act of thought itself, it cannot discriminate between reality and its announcement.”
170
 And 
this is where Badiou locates Nietzsche’s madness: Nietzsche “must come to think of 
himself as the creator of the same world in which he makes his silent declaration, and in 
which nothing proves the existence of a break in two. That in some way he is on both 
sides; that he is the name, not only of what announces the event, not only the name of the 
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rupture, but ultimately the name of the world itself.”
171
 The great anti-philosopher is left 
to declare that he, far from being “seized by its triumphal appearance”
172
, will be the one 
to create this other world: even though he would prefer to remain a professor in Basel, 
Nietzsche must in one sense become God.
173
 It is precisely this madness which discloses 
the nature of the event to be one of chance and risk, not carefully rationalized decision as 
it is for Nietzsche. 
This discussion suggests apropos Badiou that Nietzsche perhaps most 
dramatically demonstrates his need for a notion of number in the concept of his becoming 
a God, the Übermensch. From the Badiouian perspective the Übermensch represents the 
point from which we move from nothing to something, what Badiou will write in the 
particular case as 0 → 1, the break from one world to another. For Nietzsche, from the 
nothing-ness of fooling one’s-self with static notions of the world, to a point where one 
can overcome the otherworldliness of Christianity, where one can overcome the death of 
God: Nietzsche’s goal for humanity itself. But as Badiou shows throughout his 
systematic thought (and in Being and Event in particular) this is precisely the logic of 
ontology as it manifests itself throughout history: what Badiou, apropos Cantor, will 
write in the general sense as Ø → ω. Nietzsche, who arguably went mad because of his 
circular entrapment within this logic
174
 (that is, announcing the event prior to its arrival), 
far from dismantling mathematics, remains confined by its conditions: number must be 
thought. 
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To further understand how Badiou’s notion of the event and Ø → ω challenges 
the modern conception of number under capitalism, and the ontological consequences 
therein, consider how both Dennett’s philosophy and at least Dennett’s reading of 
Nietzsche’s philosophy assume a notion of number, of One-ness, which is always-already 
within its framework. Simply put, Dennett and Nietzsche’s naturalized ontology requires 
a notion of the infinite which considered from a set theoretical point of view is posited as 
a “One” or a “whole”; for example, the set of natural numbers, {1, 2, 3, … }, although 
infinite, composes a closed set, N. Again, this is in spite that fact that Nietzsche’s 
philosophy claims to dismantle the notion of number in general. As David Deane has 
stated, for Nietzsche “number cannot re-present anything other than the naming of an 
object or space within the conceptual framework of the namer, and, as such, presents only 
itself.”
175
 The nature of Nietzsche’s critique of number is situated amongst a plurality of 
related critiques—for example, his critique of Christianity or his critique of aesthetics—
all of which aim at dismantling any hopes of attempting to construct a static notion of 
what is real. This is because for Nietzsche, to attach signifiers to the world is to deny the 
True reality of the world because the world is by nature a dynamic entity and as such is 
constantly in flux in accordance with the will-to-power. To apply stasis to the world is to 
denigrate the world. Such thought is operating in accordance with what Badiou refers to 
as the “Kantian question” and its response; that is, to ask “How is pure mathematics 
possible?” and then to respond, “Thanks to the transcendental subject.”
176
 This is to say, 
number only is insofar as the subject declares it to be; outside the transcendental subject 
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who posits its existence, number is not. Here Nietzschean thought appears to diverge 
from Dennett’s thought because Dennett, unlike Nietzsche, believes that number is in 
itself a constant of that which is real. He writes, “It is worth bearing in mind that 
mathematics and physics are the same throughout the entire universe, discoverable in 
principle by aliens (if such there be) no matter what their social class, political 
predilections, gender (if they have genders!) or peccadilloes.”
177
 Interestingly however, 
although on the surface Dennett and Nietzsche seem to be in disagreement about the 
nature of number, both of their systems—that is, eternal recurrence and an evolutionary 
model of consciousness—require the same understanding of number, the One, in order to 
function. 
To understand how an understanding of number as a form of the One operates in 
both Dennett’s and Nietzsche’s naturalized ontologies (even if Nietzsche, as anti-
philosopher, is announcing its completion), consider the paradox in Nietzsche’s 
philosophy, that is, how he says number does not exist and yet he requires number to 
make such a statement. Nietzsche’s critique of number begins by assuming that the 
process of counting is accomplished by attaching a signifier to a thing: for example, a 
kettle, a cup and a saucer can be “counted” and consequently assigned the signifier “3.” 
For Nietzsche, and perhaps rightfully so, this process fails to acknowledge the dynamic 
and constantly competing nature of the world. Furthermore, it is a process that Nietzsche 
sees as not only wrong, but detrimental to our relationship with the real world. To attach 
“3” to a grouping of a kettle, a cup and a saucer is meaningless because the signifier “3” 
does not re-present anything other than the naming of the kettle, cup and saucer within 
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the mind of namer who named it “3.” The namer could have equally named it “blop” and 
if this namer ever saw a monkey, a dog and a fish, she or he could think or say “blop.” If 
I heard the namer say “blop,” the signifier would be meaningless to me, but to her it 
would be a way of re-presenting the world in a static form. In Nietzsche’s philosophical 
system, humans construct a set of signifiers (a move which separates them from what he 
would call “proto-humans”) which they can then attach to things, {kettle, cup, saucer, 
apple, monkey, booga boo, blop, … }, and then subsequently categorize these signifiers. 
The categorization of these signifiers on the part of the namer defines things like the 
namer’s Morals, Reason, Aesthetics, Values and Number. For example, person X, 
considering himself a Christian, constructs a set of signifiers for Good-ness, Good = 
{cheek turning, giving to the poor, being nice to his wife when she is annoying, loving 
his son even when he is awake at 4 in the morning, … }, which he attaches to things of 
the world. In the same way the bird participates in bird-ness if it does {x, y, z, … } the 
person, in X’s view, participates in good-ness if it does {a, b, c, … }.
178
 For Nietzsche, 
good-ness is determined by means of some axiomatic function (some mental process) and 
this function only works for certain static elements/signifiers of a special set called the 
“Good”, Good = {cheek turning, giving to the poor, … }. Number, the One, for Nietzsche 
must work in the same way. For example, X, considering himself a mathematician, 
constructs a set of signifiers for Number-ness, N = {1, 2, 3, … }, which allow him to 
make statements like, “2 + 1 = 3”. But, X can only make that statement because he 
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decides (along with all the others who consent to do the same) to call the kettle, cup and 
saucer by the arbitrary symbol, “3”. Apart from X’s (and those who consent to do the 
same) choice to capture the image of the cup, saucer and kettle, “3” is meaningless. Or as 
Deane writes, “Numbers for Nietzsche represent a language game which has a coherence 
and absolute functioning within its own terms, the conceptual realm of mathematics, but 
not outside of it. A number, for Nietzsche, is a term which represents nothing more than 
the placement of an entity within a preconceived set of rules, the information it transfers 




However, from a Badiouian perspective, Nietzsche, far from dismantling the 
notion of number, is in fact demonstrating his strict adherence to a specific understanding 
of the infinite as a closed whole. To understand what I mean by this, let us consider an 
example of number counter to what Nietzsche must utilize to describe the world, to 
construct his ontology (that which is central to Badiou’s vision of the history of ontology, 
from Plato to Heidegger as manifestations of Ø → ω). Badiou’s hero, Georg Cantor, said 
we can also count (in a sense) by putting things into one-to-one ratios: for example, if 
there are a bunch of cups on a table, and a saucer for each one, we do not know how 
many there are numerically, but we do know there is the same amount of both cups and 
saucers. Thinking of things in terms of one-to-one ratios as opposed to counting in a one-
by-one manner (ie., a cup, a saucer and a kettle are “3”) ends up with some pretty strange 
results when we no longer consider finite sets (ie. the set of things I see on the table, 
{cup, saucer, kettle}) and start thinking about infinite sets (like the set of natural 
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numbers, N = {1, 2, 3, … }). For example, there are as infinitely many odd numbers as 
there are natural numbers. At first this does not seem to make sense, one would think that 
there are twice as many natural numbers as there are odd numbers (every second one!) 
but if you put them into one-to-one ratios, they are the same. Cantor will say they share 
the same “cardinality”, that is the number of elements in the set, for example the cardinal 
number of {cup, saucer, kettle} is, as I have discussed at length above, called “3.” There 
are also as infinitely many rational numbers (any number that can be written as a fraction 
with integer values in both the numerator and the denomenator) as there are natural 
numbers, because they too (like the odd numbers and the natural numbers) can be put into 
a one-to-one ratio. But, the set of real numbers (both rational and irrational numbers, 
numbers that cannot be written as fractions with integer values in both the numerator and 
the denomenator, for example e, π, φ, √2, log 2 3 …) between 0 and 1 cannot be put into a 
one-to-one ratio with the natural numbers, they do not have the same “cardinality.”
180
 
There are more real numbers between zero and one then natural numbers, despite both 
sets being infinite. Now, of course, one may say that from a Nietzscheian perspective that 
calling this new method of counting “cardinality” just proves Nietzsche’s point that “that 
number cannot re-present anything other than the naming of an object or space within the 
conceptual framework of the namer, and, as such, presents only itself,”
181
 but the point is 
not that there is just a new signifier which we use for number, but that to do any 
“ontology” we need to have some concept of number—whether we are aware of it or not. 
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As Badiou proclaims, number must be thought.
182
 To think in this way is counter intuitive 
because, as I identified above, Nietzsche’s philosophy first asks, “How is pure 
mathematics possible?” and then respond by thinking, “Because of the transcendental 
subject.” However, Badiou, recognizing the necessity of number in ontological 
statements in general, turns this question upside down by asking, “Pure mathematics 
being the science of being, how is a subject possible?”
183
 Far from being something that 
deceives us from seeing the truth of the will-to-power, number is always operative in the 
subject, and yet at the same time it is never One, never complete. We can count that 
which is One (Badiou will call this a situation, the count-as-one), indeed we must given 
that we can never not count, but this means of counting is never All, never One. It is 
precisely this paradox, this bizarre and paradoxical form of excess, which fuels Badiou’s 
ontological thought. 
Badiou, opting for a Cantorian notion of number puts together Ø → ω, from 
which he can point to Nietzsche and see how he is stuck announcing the event before its 
arrival. For Nietzsche to say number is a concept-less submission relative to the one who 
proclaims that system, maybe he is right, but to make such an ontological statement (as 
we learn from set theory and in particular Badiou’s reading of set theory) Nietzsche must 
already have a sense of what number is. Thus the paradox, there is no number, but to 
make this case I need a concept of number. Nietzschean scholars such as Deane may 
critique the idea that Nietzsche, without knowing it, has a stable notion of number the 
same way he critiqued Danto and Schacht’s notion that Nietzsche has a stable notion of 
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nihilism that he then proceeds to utilize in any text which bears (or perhaps even does not 
bear) the signature, “Nietzsche.”
184
 In the case of a static “nihilism” to be found in 
Nietzsche, Deane, via Derrida, quite rightly (as I discussed at length above) illustrates 
“that the presupposition of a unified self called ‘Nietzsche’, which does thinking and is 
re-presented through an extenuation of the self Nietzsche in the texts bearing the 
signature ‘Nietzsche’, is never shared by Nietzsche himself.”
185
 But the same argument 
will not hold for Nietzsche’s notion of number, his adherence to the One, precisely 
because it is not Nietzsche’s number, it is the infinity he inherited. If one is capable of 
recognizing that indeed Nietzsche uses a notion of the One to construct his ontology, then 
it follows that one will also recognize that the infinity which Nietzsche utilizes for his 
ontology is nothing more than the mathematics available to him at his time in history. 
This is why Badiou argues in the introduction to Being and Event that if one is really 
dedicated to forming a new ontology one should learn all available mathematics and then 
perhaps an event will occur from which a new mathematics arises which one could then 
utilize to speak of being in a new way (once again, the stress is on perhaps or 
contingency). Or, as in the case of Badiou, find an old mathematical event which has not 
been properly mined just yet: ie. Cantor. In the same vein, if Badiou were to engage 
Dennett (which I am confident he would never do because in it seems that Dennett is 
simply a failed Nietzschean in the sense that he ascribes to the tenets of eternal 
recurrence and the will-to-power, but for whatever reason does not take this philosophy 
to its proper end—that is, there is no truth, God is dead—rather he opts for a notion of 
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altruism, a philosophy of the One) he could make the exact same critique of his 
understanding of number. Dennett says person X does a good act if it fits the Moral First 
Aid Manual, which we could call set MFAM = {has food to eat, has shelter, … }. And 
here again I am forced to repeat Badiou’s maxim, number must be thought. 
And here we arrive at a crucial point in Badiou’s thought: this notion of number, 
this thinking of the One, which I have shown to be found in the ontology of Nietzsche 
and Dennett, is precisely the notion of number that capitalism requires. Under the rule of 
capital we must count, and count in a very specific way. As Badiou writes, 
The ideology of modern parliamentary societies, if they have one, is not 
humanism, law, or the subject. It is number, the countable, countability. 
Every citizen is expected to be cognisant of foreign trade figures, of the 
flexibility of the exchange rate, of fluctuations in stock prices. These 
figures are presented as the real to which other figures refer: governmental 
figures, votes and opinion polls. Our so-called ‘situation’ is the 
intersection of economic numericality and the numericality of opinion.
186
 
The unquestioned notion of number underlying the structure of such contemporary 
ontologies as Dennett’s evolutionary model of consciousness and Nietzsche’s philosophy 
of eternal recurrence, the One, is the same as that which underlies capitalist logics. 
Inherent to such logics are the two elements I teased out of Dennett’s philosophy in 
Section 1.01 and 1.02 of this thesis, that is, (1) Western liberal democracy as a “natural” 
progression, and (2) the necessity of positing an abstraction by which to engage with real 
world societal relations. And it is because of contemporary culture’s “unthought slavery” 
                                                 
186
 Badiou, Number and Numbers, 3. 
70 
 
to this structure that Badiou asks at the beginning of Number and Numbers, “isn’t 
another idea of number necessary?”
187
 And why he then proceeds, in chapters 7 through 
18, to construct a rogue ontology based on Cantor’s insights into mathematics. (Chapters 
1 through 6 are a brief history of the understanding of number beginning with Greek 
understandings and ending with Cantor.) Perhaps Badiou constructs a faulty or even 
failed ontological structure in Number and Numbers, but such is not the point. The point 
is that if one takes his foundational maxim seriously, that is “number must be thought”, 
which I have argued one must, Cantor’s insights demonstrate that a new understanding of 
being is possible, regardless of what the exact details of such an ontology would look 
like; from the mystical to the philosophical. To challenge the dominant form of number 
active in one’s mind is to rage against one’s adherence to capitalist ways of being, against 
what Žižek describes, apropos Lacan, as the “point of apocalypse […, the] saturation of 




To understand what shape Badiou’s ontology takes one must consider how 
Badiou thinks of nothingness, and in particular, the relationship of nothingness to 
philosophical thought. In a lecture entitled “Beyond Positivism and Nihilism” delivered 
at the European Graduate School in 2010, Badiou spoke about the state of knowledge in 
contemporary philosophy.
189
 He began his lecture by appealing to Socrates’ famous 
statement, “I know one thing, I know nothing.” Socrates’ statement is ironic, of course, 
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because it equates something with nothing; however, Badiou suggests that the tradition of 
philosophy is somehow about this paradox, that nothing is the unique thing that we can 
know. This paradoxical equating—of nothing and something—reveals that philosophy is 
interested in the great question of nothingness, the question of the existence of negativity. 
If one can accept this line of reasoning, then a number of questions follow: is it possible 
to know something that does not exist? If there is something that does not exist, what is 
our relationship to it? From contemplating such questions Badiou comes to accept that 
philosophy in general is concerned with the difference (albeit a very obscure difference) 
between “to be” and “to exist.”
190
 And furthermore, that the distance between “to be” and 
“to exist” is precisely the difference between something and nothing, being and 
nothingness. It is significant to note that this exact point will be raised again in Section 
1.13 when considering Radically Orthodox responses to contemporary ontology, but 
viewed from a Thomistic perspective. 
As stated in the Introduction to this thesis, Badiou understands there to be two 
main opponents to philosophy: positivism and nihilism. He names positivism the 
affirmation that there exists only knowledge: what exists is only in the form of objectivity 
and therefore the true form of knowledge is science. The positivist, like Dennett, must 
say that philosophy is a science or it does not exist. As such, Badiou presents the 
following question to the positivist: “From which point of view are you saying that that 
sort of process is science and that that sort of process is not science.” If all knowledge is 
science, then the knowledge of what science is is also a science—but a science of 
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sciences does not really exist in the sense that science determines is-ness.  Badiou argues 
one must discern what the difference is between the being of science and the existence of 
science or else one succumbs to the failures the positivist makes in having always-already 
assumed the distance between “to be” and “to exist.” Science says truth exists if it 
follows certain rules, for example if a phenomenon is repeatable and quantifiable. In this 
sense science is capable of constructing a potentially infinite set of truths. This set could 
be represented as, T = {F = ma, F = G(m1∙m2)/r
2
, aR = v
2
/r, cell structure, the periodic 
table, …}. Because set T adheres to certain rules, science as a field of knowledge says set 
T is true, but paradoxically the rules of science do not belong in the set T. The scientist 
must first assume the being of set T in order to establish the existence of its truths. 
In contrast to the positivist’s position, the philosopher cannot begin by saying 
anything about being as such, because being is not a knowledge. Knowledge begins and 
continues, it is transmitted in stages as in physics, mathematics, chemistry, sociology, 
history, etc. Philosophy refuses this position by always beginning; and as such it assumes 
its past as a sort of successive beginnings. If philosophy’s past is composed of 
beginnings, then given that it does not continue, the beginning of philosophy is a very 
important question (as I examined in relation to Badiou’s reading of Nietzschean 
thought). Badiou argues that philosophers do not, like Dennett say, “I now know this, so 
let’s proceed from here.” On the contrary, like Nietzsche they say, “I begin…” then they 
give new interpretations of the past (however, and as Badiou observes as unfortunate for 
Nietzsche, their beginning stems from an event that has already been). As a scientist one 
can state the beginning of an evolutionary model of consciousness or a Newtonian law of 
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physics, and build upon it, but such a move is different than philosophy, for philosophy is 
the beginning of a new world in a sense. It begins something, but, what is this beginning? 
Badiou argues that if philosophy does not begin by an object, because it is not in 
the field of knowledge, then philosophy must begin by negativity: one must begin, like 
Socrates, in nothing-ness. Beginning in nothing-ness implies a form of subjective 
experience common to all philosophy. Of course the nature of this experience may differ 
between individuals (Badiou offers Kierkegaard and Heiddegger as examples) but the 
key is that this experience is something that happens. For Badiou, it is in the possibility of 
nothingness that one experiences the possibility of the complete non-sense of life; and 
one is never the same after this experience, one is transformed. If philosophy is not a 
knowledge, it is precisely because the object of philosophy is not a thing, but rather, 
because it is this form of subjective experience. And consequently, the existence of 
philosophy is the possibility that something is which does not exist. As such, philosophy 
does not begin in books (although, of course, Badiou acknowledges that one must read 
books), or in a rational decision, rather it begins in experience. In this sense Badiou sees 
in Descartes’ radical doubt, a transformative experience that allows him to move from 
nothing to something, as a move which gives certainty to his existence. This movement is 
what Badiou understands as the universal philosophical experience, and it is this 
universal philosophical experience which Badiou argues as the proper structure for our 
understanding of number (apropos Cantor). 
At this point, one must note that nihilism, for Badiou, is when one cannot go 
beyond the experience of negativity: or, in Cartesian language, when one cannot get 
beyond the doubt without God.  Nihilism is the reverse of positivism (what Badiou 
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defines as thinking without the experience of negativity), it is the conviction that there is 
indeed something that is not knowledge; however, it simultaneously maintains that 
knowledge is not serious. For the true nihilist, what is important is subjective experience, 
a point which is in common with philosophy—to admit that we must begin with a 
radically subjective experience—but nihilism insists that this position of negativity 
cannot be interrupted, we stay in the experience of negativity. The subject can only exist 
in nothing-ness itself. Interestingly, however, without the experience of nihilism, there is 
no philosophy. Without this experience, philosophy is academic, or reducible to a 
knowledge. Philosophy is the idea that we can go beyond nihilism: there exists truth, we 
can understand the difference between being and existence. And in this sense, although 
negativity is the beginning of philosophy, the great question of philosophy is affirmation. 
The beginning is a rupture with the positivist position, but the great question is a rupture 
with nihilism. 
Badiou believes that in every great philosophy you find this “double fight”: 
between nothing-ness and affirmation of some-thing. Using the metaphor of music 
(Badiou argues that music also takes part in this “double fight” of philosophy because it 
first fights against the silence, only to return to it), Badiou challenges his students, to find 
the “tonality” of the nihilism in the philosophical writings with which they engage: where 
is the nihilism of Descartes? Kierkegaard? Heidegger? But it is a double tonality, so 
Badiou also challenges his students to find the other tonality, the affirmative position, the 
one that came from this nihilism.  He argues all philosophy must be read from this 
dialectical position. For example, Badiou points out that Kant begins with negativity in 
saying, all that we can say about God in the affirmative is imaginary or false, we cannot 
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know the real being: this is the first fundamental affirmation of Kant.  Therefore the first 
experience of Kant is not positive, it is negative. But, only in beginning in negativity can 
Kant transform and consequently construct his positive arrangement of the real (albeit an 
incorrect arrangement). And most importantly, this challenge is a challenge to modern 
conceptions of number, of One-ness, and the experiences that lie therein. Badiou 
summarizes this as 0 → 1, a specific case of moving from nothing to something, and Ø 
→ ω, that which is ontology in general. Thus to do as Badiou asks is to seek an 
alternative understanding of number to that which is dictated by the contemporary 
context: that of capital. From this perspective, the philosophical position of Dennett, the 
protestors (the Occupiers), the political leaders and the bankers are all a case of 0 → 1. 
Badiou will claim that theology, and thus Christianity, is a specific case, 0 → 1. But, is 
Badiou right? Is even Christianity a philosophy of the One, even if it is “the foundation of 
universalism”
191
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1.1 Thinking the One: A Theological Example 
 
In this section I examine the extent to which the theological movement known as Radical 
Orthodoxy is operating in accordance with the Badiouian category of a thinking of the 
One. Putting aside the wide range and depth of ideas found in Radical Orthodoxy, the 
movement is a good contemporary theological example to engage because it has earned a 
fair amount of attention, both positive and negative, since its inception in the early 
nineties. Perhaps the most popular theorist to engage Radical Orthodoxy on a critical 
level has been the immensely famous Slovenian philosopher and cultural critique, Slavoj 
Žižek.
192
 Of the various engagements Žižek has made with Radical Orthodox 
theologians,
193
 one notable contribution is his debate with John Milbank in The 
Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or Dialectic? In this text, Žižek, acting as an atheist, 
rightly sees an opportunity to engage in debate with a theist which does not result in the 
same form of theist/atheist debates made popular by the likes of Richard Dawkins, Sam 
Harris and the late Christopher Hitchens. Creston Davis describes such main stream 
debates as “limited and not very intellectually significant. [They are] more an exercise in 
ideological (mis)interpretation of the same premises than a real debate, because [they 
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fail] to risk forgoing the very existence of what both sides presuppose.”
194
 In contrast 
Davis correctly describes the conversation between Milbank and Žižek as taking “place 
on an entirely different plane, as they are not only concerned with how reason (Logos-
Word) connects up and distinguishes between different concepts, but also—and perhaps 
more importantly—they interrogate the very foundation of reason as such, and help stage 
a theology that resists global capitalism.”
195
 It is precisely the extent to which Radical 
Orthodoxy is capable of staging such a theology that is my interest in this section of my 
thesis. 
Although composed of many different theologians with numerous unique 
interests,
196
 in general it can be said that as a movement Radical Orthodoxy offers a re-
reading of history in an attempt to do what Henri DeLubac calls “absorption,” or, what 
John Milbank will refer to as “out-narration.”
197
 Milbank describes his motivations to 
out-narrate as being fueled by a drive to confront to the rise of a secular liberal autonomy 
in the West, particularly since the end of the Second World War.
198
 However, out-
narration does not aim to counter the rise of secular reason with a new and secure 
theological rationality which is resistant to secular reasoning in late modernity; rather, it 
aims to trace the history of how the problems of modernity came to function and in doing 
so to show how these are not problems outside of theology but within it. In doing so, 
Milbank and the Radical Orthodox movement in general can outnarrate the problems they 
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locate in late modernity by showing how these problems can be viewed under a different 
aspect in a similar way to how DeLubac aimed to “absorb” such problems.
199
 As a result, 
the same language used in late modernity is illuminated by theology; as Radically 
Orthodox theologian D. Stephen Long describes, not in the form of “some special 
privileged epistemology, but [in] a way of recognizing a depth to our everyday natural 
vision that need not conflict with that vision.”
200
 This illumination presents humanity 
with the struggle of wrestling with a mystery of which one cannot know and it is within 
this human condition in which reality is made manifest. In this way, the concept of 
absorption or outnarration is central to the theological project of Radical Orthodoxy in 
that it hopes that by telling a more beautiful story it can respond to the banality fabricated 
by what Milbank refers to as the “bastard dualisms” of modernity.
201
 In telling a better 
story than that of modernity, humanity can address the otherness of God while 
acknowledging the reality of its being in the world. This is to say, humanity can open 
itself up to the love of God by His gift of his only Son through the power of the Holy 
Spirit, and only then can the world become illuminated in relationship with the reality of 
the Triune God. 
Before proceeding with my analysis I would like to note that in the same way I 
was not restricted to choosing Daniel Dennett’s philosophy as a means of presenting a 
positivist discourse acting in accordance with the Badiouian category of a thinking of the 
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One, I fully recognize that I am not restricted to choosing the work of Radical Orthodoxy 
as a means of addressing the extent to which theology adheres to the same logics as 
Dennett’s philosophy. For example, instead of Radical Orthodoxy, I could have 
addressed the turn to negative theology amongst such writers as J. D. Caputo. J. Aaron 
Simmons has used Caputo as an example when arguing that the “genuinely important 
negative theological trajectory in much of postmodern/continental/deconstructive 
philosophy of religion has led to its own problematic dogmatism.”
202
 Simmons correctly 
understands that “Although Caputo does claim that he offers ‘no final opinion’ about God 
‘as an entitative issue’ (2006, 10), his account of the ‘strong theology,’ to which he is so 
strenuously opposed, ends up looking a lot like any perspective that understands God as a 
personal being.”
203
 Does the dogmatism that Simmons locates in the recent negative 
theology employ the same logics at work in Dennett’s philosophy? Does negative 
theology assume the notion of number, that of the One, implicit to modernity? I believe 
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1.11 (De-) Evolutionary progression 
 
To begin my investigation into how Radical Orthodoxy represents an example of a 
Badiouian thinking of the One in this section I address the logical element described in 
Section 1.01, that is, how both Western liberal democratic capitalism and an evolutionary 
model of consciousness need to be understood as natural progressions. I start by 
describing Michael Foucault’s notion of historical ontologies from his essay, “What is 
Enlightenment?” Here I distinguish between thinking of modernity as an attitude as 
opposed to a period of history. Such a distinction makes it clearer as to how theological 
re-readings of history, such as that made by Radical Orthodoxy, present evolutionary 
discourses if they advance a view of a period in history when things were “better” and 
then went awry, or a “before” things got disoriented: an outlook which Slavoj Žižek 
perhaps unflatteringly refers to as “nostalgia.”
204
 I then establish how this outlook is 
equivalent to the element of capitalist logic I identified in Daniel Dennett’s philosophy,
205
 
this is, of course, in the sense that Radical Orthodoxy offers the obverse side to Dennett’s 
evolutionary model of consciousness: a de-evolutionary discourse operating in a similar 
way to which Žižek describes communism as simply the obverse side of capitalism.
206
 
 In his essay, “What is Enlightenment?” Michael Foucault suggests that we view 
modernity not as a period of history, but rather an attitude or a contemporary mode of 
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 This mode of relationship is a way of thinking and feeling and 
furthermore, for the purposes of this thesis, “a way, too, of acting and behaving that at 
one and the same time marks a relation of belonging and presents itself as a task.”
 208
 The 
task which Foucault refers to here is the attempt within the contemporary context, what I 
have been referring to as late modernity, to distinguish oneself from selves in other 
periods of history. The time period which Radical Orthodoxy aims to distinguish the 
contemporary time period from is “the pre-modern” or perhaps more specifically, a 
Thomistic or an Augustinian period.
209
 Foucault argues that “rather than seeking to 
distinguish the ‘modern era’ from the ‘premodern’ or ‘postmodern,’ […] it would be 
more useful to try to find out how the attitude of modernity, ever since its formation, has 
found itself struggling with attitudes of ‘countermodernity.’”
210
 As such, Foucault claims 
that modernity is not only a form of relationship with the present, in distinction from the 
past, but in addition it is a “mode of relationship that has to be established with oneself. 
The deliberate attitude of modernity is tied to an indispensable asceticism. To be modern 
is not to accept oneself as one is in the flux of the passing moments; it is to take oneself 
as object of a complex and difficult elaboration.”
211
 As I explained in Section 1.0 of this 
thesis, in Dennett’s terms this is to say modern man is nothing more than a complex 
system of memes all competing for space in a brain acting as a self-sufficient closed 
whole that can be rewritten like the hard drive of a computer. This “man” can write a 
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“Moral First Aid Manual” and determine what memes should stay in the system as 
“conversation-stoppers.” In terms of this description Foucault rightly observes that 
modern man “is not the man who goes off to discover himself, his secrets and his hidden 
truth; he is the man who tries to invent himself. This modernity does not ‘liberate man in 
his own being’; it compels him to face the task of producing himself.”
212
 Such is the state 
of philosophical thought in late modernity: “one that simultaneously problematizes man's 
relation to the present, man's historical mode of being, and the constitution of the self as 
an autonomous subject. And such is the attitude of man: a philosophical ethos that could 
be described as a permanent critique of our historical era.”
213
 
This contemporary attitude results in what Foucault refers to as the “blackmail”
214
 
of the Enlightenment. This blackmail defines a certain manner of philosophizing, a mode 
of reflective relation to the present. Thus, in the contemporary context philosophy is 
faced with a choice: 
you either accept the Enlightenment and remain within the tradition of its 
rationalism (this is considered a positive term by some and used by others, 
on the contrary, as a reproach); or else you criticize the Enlightenment and 
then try to escape from its principles of rationality (which may be seen 
once again as good or bad). […] We must try to proceed with the analysis 
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Blackmailed into this form of philosophizing Foucault perceives that one must perform a 
series of historical inquiries that are as precise as possible; However, these historical 
inquiries are not an attempt to achieve the kernel of truth that the Enlightenment project 
sought, on the contrary, “they will be oriented toward the ‘contemporary limits of the 
necessary,’ that is, toward what is not or is no longer indispensable for the constitution of 
ourselves as autonomous subjects.”
216
 In light of this, Foucault warns that “the historical 
ontology of ourselves must turn away from all projects that claim to be global or radical. 
In fact we know from experience that the claim to escape from the system of 
contemporary reality so as to produce the overall programs of another society, of another 
way of thinking, another culture, another vision of the world, has led only to the return of 
the most dangerous traditions.”
217
 
It is here that my concern with the project of Radical Orthodoxy becomes 
obvious. Does the Radical Orthodox project, one which strives to respond to the failures 
of modernity, simply offer another ontological option that claims universality in the same 
way as Dennett? This is to ask, does Radical Orthodoxy overlook the task of 
contemplating the “contemporary limits of the necessary”
 218
 by simply constructing a 
“[project] that claim[s] to be global or radical […: a] return of the most dangerous 
traditions”?
219
 My apprehension is in accordance with Foucault when he wonders, “if we 
limit ourselves to this type of always partial and local inquiry or test, do we not run the 
risk of letting ourselves be determined by more general structures of which we may well 
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not be conscious, and over which we may have no control?”
220
 If Radical Orthodoxy 
demands that we engage pre-modern ways of being, that is Thomistic or Augustinian 
ways of being, then what does this engagement imply? D. Stephen Long argues that the 
future of theology depends on how we inherit Aquinas,
221
 but, who or what is this 
“Aquinas” we are to inherit? Is there a True-reality, a True-Aquinas from which 
discourse of the real has simply regressed from? And is it simply a matter of returning to 
said discourse? 
The now famous opening line to Milbank’s book, Theology and Social Theory—
which is widely considered to be the inaugural text in the history of the Radical Orthodox 
movement—is, “Once, there was no ‘secular’.”
222
 So begins the historical narrative with 
which Milbank hopes to woo his audience. In imagining a world in which there is no 
secular one is imagining a world in which all facets of life, from the political to the 
aesthetic, are in some way informed by a notion of God. Humanity is in some sense 
governed by its orientation to the Church.
223
 However, with the rise in the wars of 
religion and the development of science a sense in which humanity is able to be liberated 
through the use of reason alone manifests itself as the dominant philosophical position. 
Here it is no longer a perception of a sacred order which directs the world, but rather an 
objective perception of a natural order.
224
 In this world it is accepted that there is a 
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neutral public space from which humanity can consider things such as politics, aesthetics 
and ethics. 
This story is precisely the same “simple and enchanting tale”
225
 I quoted from 
David Bentley Hart in Section 1.b of this thesis; However, as I pointed out in Section 
1.01, one must keep in mind that the important point about this tale was not the extent to 
which it is true, but rather the fact that it is the dominant story within late modernity. In 
Theology and Social Theory, Milbank goes to great lengths to show that this tale is 
erroneous in the sense that rather than the theological getting pushed out of the public 
realm, in modernity the theological takes on warped and disoriented forms. The secular 
as a public and neutral sphere remains pseudo-theological as it maintains accounts of 
ultimate truths, meanings, orientations and priorities.
226
 There is never a space where the 
theological is not operating, for in a sense all discourse is inherently theo-logical. Secular 
space establishes a plurality of “bastard dualisms”
227
 which contemporary culture 
unconsciously accepts as being capable of reconstructing reality in language. For 
Milbank however, such dualisms become the pseudo-theo-logical discourse by which one 
may speak of what is and consequently compose idolatrous understandings of the real. 
Consider the university for example: within the university there are two main areas of 
study, the natural sciences and the humanities. In these two areas there are sub-categories 
which intend to say everything about their individual field. Thus, for example, the 
historians aim to say everything about history, the chemists aim to say everything about 
chemicals, the English scholars aim to say everything about literature, the biologists aim 
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to say everything about life and the theologians aim to say everything about something 
called religion. Radical Orthodoxy however rejects this particular mode of thinking about 
the world by appealing to the work of Thomas Aquinas and a pre-modern sensibility: that 
which one could refer to as a participatory ontology. Thomas says that theology, far from 
being about some-one-thing called “religion,” is about God and all things in relation to or 
in participation with God. Interestingly, this definition too concerns everything, it 
excludes nothing in creation. This is enormously provocative because it implies that there 
is nothing to which theology is not concerned. Theology under the Radical Orthodoxy 











 and so on and so forth. Radical 
Orthodoxy claims that we can only say something about the different fields insofar as 
they are in relationship with the transcendent. In this way Radical Orthodoxy sees itself 
as a playful and imaginative movement at the same time that it is incredibly serious. 
Because Radical Orthodoxy tells a story in which there is an historical 
development into a secular realm, which nonetheless maintains (because it must) a 
theological sensibility (albeit an idolatrous theology) it is important for the movement to 
decipher what form of sensibility this comes to take. For Radical Orthodoxy, within 
modernity a theology of power takes the place of a theology of the sacred under the 
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 As evidenced by the naturalized ontologies of both Dennett and Nietzsche, 
ontologies of power are by their very nature ontologies of conflict and competition. 
Within this ontology, as I described in Section 1.02 with regards to Dennett’s “Moral 
First Aid Manual,” it is understood that at the very basic level political subjects, human 
beings, need protection from one another. For Dennett, the idea of “rights,” written in the 
“Moral First Aid Manual,” were the means to establishing this protection. However, as I 
discussed in regards to the examples of art, charity, and economics, the ability to 
categorize these rights is not always straight forward. Thus, the freedom to exercise one’s 
“rights” is in a perpetual state of competition and conflict. Or, as Dennett would say, the 
“good” meme’s are constantly in competition for space in the brain’s inner hard drive. 
For Milbank, and Radical Orthodoxy in general, Dennett’s philosophy must be 
understood as a pseudo-theology. The roots of this equating can be traced back to an 
orthodox Christian notion of being in the work of Augustine; however, in Augustine we 
find a narrative that says this competitive and violent ontology is not the normative 
ontological state of humanity. For Augustine the normative ontological state of humanity 
is that of love, an ontology of peace as we find in the early Biblical creation stories.
234
 
Creation in its most fundamental sense is a loving gift, and thus violence is alien to the 
original state of the created order. Radical Orthodoxy argues that we need to come to see 
the competitive order, which is so prevalent today, far from being a natural state of 
things, as a deviation from the Real order of things. Radical Orthodoxy, in this sense, 
aims to direct one’s view away from the view of the world as existing in an inherently 
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competitive and violent state of being, into an ontology of love and peace, as described 
by the early Church Fathers: where what is primary is the order of the Good and as such 
evil is not a positive thing, but rather a privation of this Good.
235
 
 At this point however one can clearly see that this beautiful and persuasive story, 
this re-telling of history that aims to out-narrate, is indeed a story of the de-evolution of 
the mind. It the obverse side to Dennett’s reading of the history of the mind as a natural 
progression from simple replicators to the complex hardware IBM scientists are reverse 
engineering today. This is to say, Radical Orthodoxy must read the passage of time, 
specifically over the last seven hundred years or so, as an un-natural digression from that 
which truely is (as opposed to a natural evolution into that which is as Dennett aims to 
establish). In this sense Radical Orthodoxy adheres to the same “simple and enchanting 
tale” told by Hart in Section 1.01 of this thesis, simply in reverse. Radical Orthodoxy’s 
theology is precisely what Foucault describes as “a philosophical ethos that could be 
described as a permanent critique of our historical era.”
236
 
In response to the charge that Radical Orthodoxy operates in accordance with the 
same evolutionary logics as Dennett’s philosophy, certain Radical Orthodox theologians 
would certainly argue that such is only the case if the concept of time is not an issue. For 
example, Radically Orthodox theologian Laurence Paul Hemming describes how our 
understanding of time has direct implications on our understanding of faith. And 
consequently, our understanding of faith in general may render the very notion of the 
development of a thing called “history” as problematic. Hemming writes, 
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Faithfulness is so, not because I attempt to bring myself into conformity 
with a particularly conceived tradition or body of thought—a kind of 
‘correspondence’ of myself to what is true (carried out as an act of will 
and its repetitions) and which therefore is always looking backwards, into 
what has gone before as the deciding and so decisive determination of my 
being-true as being-faithful. This understanding of time immediately 
raises the unfolding development of tradition as a problem. Rather, I 
belong to the tradition as something which lies ahead of me and from 
within which, and so out of which, I am formed. Tradition, the traditio or 
‘handing over’, is not simply something which is handed over to me, but 
rather something over to which I am first delivered, am ‘proper to’.
237
 
In contrast to the vision of history as some-thing which proceeds through time, or, as 
some-thing which is in-itself, or some-thing which I can objectively view, history is 
rather the tradition to which I am constitutive by being in relationship with, forming it as 
I am being formed. As Hemming notes, “I am the potential horizon of its being made 
actual, its realization. Thought in terms of salvation, my being is the place where, through 
this conversation, this ‘being proper to…’ God comes to be, which means the ‘how’ of 
my being Christian will indicate something about me (from the perspective of my growth 
and maturity in Christ) and something about God (how God comes to be found in me by 
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 Faith is not adhering to a Reality which is unfolding in-itself through time, 
rather, faith is that which makes something real by bringing it about in time.  
Indeed, John Milbank would agree with this view of time, when he describes how 
“[time] forms habitual patterns, whether of things or of people. Both are these habits, 
which impose a kind of ‘actual necessity’ beyond the reign of mere logical possibility, 
whether or not this actual necessity is itself a mere accident.”
239
 For Radical Orthodoxy, 
this view implicitly conceives of time as a means of disclosing both the “how” and the 
“what” of being-human. And in this sense time orients the person in relationship toward 
others and towards God. Thus Hemming can argue, 
Orthodoxy in this sense ceases to be ‘assertion’ and is better understood as 
prayer and, most formally, as sacrament—as relationship to God brought 
about in the communal speech of the assembly as a mode of being of 
Christ: a mode of revelation of something not-human (the divine) within 
something human (me, the assembly). In outline (and it is here no more 
than a sketch), this is the way in which many of the patristic authors at 
least thought the relationship between God, the creation and the human 
person: pluriformity redeemed as unity.
240
 
Here Radical Orthodoxy unquestionable uses Christology and sacramental categories as 
ontological classifications. This is to say, in light of fact that time is not comprehended as 
a transition from the past to the future via the present forming something Real which we 
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could then refer to as “history,” we can “nonetheless hear and repeat the truth of this 
passage in the ecclesial praise of the Father offered through the Son in the Spirit.”
241
 
Radical Orthodoxy’s nuanced understanding of time undoubtedly complicates the 
accusation that the movement in general follows a (de-)evolutionary model of 
consciousness understood as an (un-)natural progression; however, in composing a 
hierarchy of discourse (of which Aquinas and the Church Fathers would be at the top) the 
threat of Radical Orthodoxy presenting “a philosophical ethos that could be described as 
a permanent critique of our historical era”
242
 remains. Again, this is to ask, does Radical 
Orthodoxy overlook the task of contemplating the “contemporary limits of the 
necessary”
243
 by simply constructing a “[project] that claim[s] to be global or radical”
244
 
by insisting upon a return to the past? A positing of a True-reality that once was but is no 
longer, and consequently, of which we must overcome certain obstacles in order to return 
to? It is with these questions in mind that in the next section I compare the logic 
governing the theological language of Radical Orthodoxy with the logic governing the 
language of Dennett’s philosophy of consciousness. A task which ultimately intends to 
further illustrate the extent to which Radical Orthodoxy operates within the category of a 
Badiouian thinking of the One. 
 
 
                                                 
241
 John Milbank, Graham Ward and Catherine Pickstock, “Suspending the Material: The Turn of Radical 
Orthodoxy,” in Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology, edited by John Milbank, Graham Ward and Catherine 
Pickstock (New York: Routledge, 1999), 8. 
242
 Michel Foucault, “What is Enlightenment,” in The Foucault Reader edited by Paul Rabinow (United 
States of America: Vintage, 1984), 42. 
243
 Foucault, “What is Enlightenment,” 43. 
244
 Foucault, “What is Enlightenment,” 46. 
92 
 
1.12  Positing an abstraction: Radical Orthodoxy’s analogia entis 
 
After a lecture entitled “What are the Roots of the Distinction between Theology and 
Philosophy,” at Georgetown University on April 7, 2011, Jean-Luc Marion was asked by 
Ilia Delio, “Are we coming to a new place where we are either at a new level of 
metaphysics, or kataphysics; […] or are we coming back to a new patristic experience of 
reality, in other words, are we kind of revisiting what took place in the early patristic 
period, that spirituality in a sense, that experience of being.”
245
 Such questioning is 
precisely the sort of thinking that may potentially lead theologies such as Radical 
Orthodoxy to posit an abstraction representative of a “True-theological-reality,” or a 
“revisiting-of-what-took-place.” And furthermore, particularly since the dialogues that 
took place between Jacques Derrida and Marion in the late nineties,
246
 such questioning 
invokes a debate in philosophy regarding something which is sometimes referred to as 
the “theological turn.” The details of what is implied by such a turn bring up a number of 
diverse controversies and discussions, the details of which are well beyond the scope of 
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 however, one reoccurring idea has been what different theorists, including a 
number of Radically Orthodox theologians, have referred to as the “difference of 
theology.”
248
 Although a complicated and nuanced idea, in one sense the difference of 
theology can be understood as setting up of an either/or with other ontologies; such as 
Dennett’s evolutionary model of consciousness I described in Section 1.0 of this thesis. 
At a certain level this either/or is capable of being reduced to either utilizing some notion 
of the transcendent in various ways—for example, Levinas and the face, Marion and the 
saturated phenomenon, Pickstock and transubstantiation, Hart and the aesthetics of 
Christian Truth, etc.—to guarantee the possibility of meaning (the theological turn), or, 
understanding existence as a violent will-to-power, where there is no good and evil, 
simply the play of power structures: or in other words, Dionysus against the Crucified.
249
 
For example, consider Radical Orthodox theologian Graham Ward’s introduction 
to the Blackwell Companion to Postmodern Theology, “Introduction: ‘Where We 
Stand.’” In this article Ward performs an investigation of the present relationship 
between thinking and cultural/historical context. To do so Ward begins by distinguishing 
between two forms of cultural transformation: (1) transformation within the logics of a 
certain movement, and (2) transformation as breaking from the cultural logic of the past 
or present.
250
 This distinction means Ward, unlike many of his contemporaries, 
differentiates between post-modernity (the position in which we presently find ourselves) 
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and post-modernism (a philosophy in rejection of meta-narratives: this is of course, 
ironically, with the exception of the meta-narrative which establishes the rejection of 
meta-narratives). In progressing from these foundational principles, Ward very aptly 
observes how “[w]e have produced a culture of fetishes or virtual objects.  For now 
everything is not only measurable and priced, it has an image. It is the image which now 
governs what is both measured and priced.”
251
 In this new world, after the transformation 
from being governed by calculation and control to being governed by the possibility of 
reification and commodification, desire is captured and subsequently disoriented by the 
seemingly infinite production and dissemination of floating signifiers.
252
 As Ward 
describes, in post-modernity “we move beyond the death of God which modernity 
announced, to a final forgetting of the transcendental altogether, to a state of godlessness 
so profound that nothing can be conceived behind the exchange of signs and the creation 
of symbolic structures.”
253
 For Ward, the acceptance of this state, what he calls “society’s 
real unreality,”
254
 demands the realization of the ineffectiveness of any cultural critique 
and consequently “the implosion of secularism.”
255
 Ward argues that this implosion of 
secularism ultimately opens up a radical space for a return of the theological, not only for 
theologians, but for artists, philosophers, and cultural analysts. Thus, Ward argues that 
“without the radicality that a theological perspective can offer the postmodern critique, 
the postmodernist is doomed also to inscribe the ideology he or she seeks to overthrow. 
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The radical critique is not radical enough.”
256
 And this is precisely where the difference 
of theology becomes a new and intriguing position to consider. There is no question that 
Ward raises a number of pertinent concerns in regards to the relationship between 
modern thinking and its cultural/historical context, but is Ward capable of making such 
confident statements about the difference of theology without slipping back into the exact 
position he critiques, namely a “real unreality”
257
? This is to ask, is there really a 
difference of theology? Or is theology just simply one more ontological option, one more 
Badiouian thinking of the One: be it Bonhoeffer-ian, Barth-ian, DeLubac-ian, Marion-
istic, Ward-ian, Radically Orthodox? Is Ward “doomed […] to inscribe the ideology he 
[…] seeks to overthrow”
258
? 
It is tempting to categorize Ward’s argument in terms of what Paul Lakeland 
describes as the “nostalgic postmodern or countermodern.”
259
 Ward’s rallying cry—
alongside his Radically Orthodox counterparts—for a “new emphasis upon 
reenchantment”
260
 seems to suggest precisely what Lakeland refers to as a “suspicion of 
the recent past and [an] attempt at the retrieval of what they perceive to be characteristics 
of an earlier time,”
261
 regardless of how hard Ward may insist that “[w]e live in the 
trajectory of what is coming to us from the future; we never return to the same place 
twice to rethink the choices abandoned.”
262
 Indeed, Radical Orthodoxy has had to deal 
with the critique of promoting a sense of nostalgia. For example, in the March 2006 issue 
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of the Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Ward responded to Elizabeth A. 
Castelli’s argument that his writing conveys the sense of a “future-nostalgia.”
263
 In his 
response to Castelli, Ward describes how his initial reaction to her description of his 
work was denial; however, after deeper reflection Ward came to believe that this reaction 
was “[n]ot on the basis of believing [he was] right and she [was] wrong. Rather, [his] 
denial arose from being enmeshed in a certain cultural politics concerning Radical 
Orthodoxy—such that [his] comments on the future of religion were being read through a 
lens provided by a circumscribed understanding of whatever Radical Orthodoxy has 
come to mean.”
264
 Radical Orthodox theologian Catherine Pickstock picks up on this 
very point in her critique of Richard Cross’s reading of Radical Orthodoxy and its 
understanding of the work of Duns Scotus (who will be discussed at length in the next 
section, Section 1.13). Pickstock notes how Cross reads Aquinas and Scotus through a 
lens which presents them as both having a representational theory of knowledge and as 
such one would clearly read Scotus as the more convincing theologian.
265
 Having come 
to understand Castelli’s comments in this way Ward began to accept “nostalgia” as a fair 
description of his work (albeit without the negative connotations prescribed by Castelli). 
He felt justified in accepting this description insofar as one accepts that 
since at least the work of Gadamer and de Certeau on historiography and 
the writing of history, we can appreciate the past is never simply the past. 
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It is the past as conceived through the cultural emphases of the present. In 
reaction to the abstractions, dualities, and grand narratives of modernity, 
postmodernity has fostered an academic concern with practices, 
performances, embodiment, and material cultures. No doubt these 
emphases, which have also refashioned investigations in religious studies, 
become visible in [Ward’s] reading of Augustine’s treatise on religion, 
and [he constructs] the future trajectories of religion in terms of a “return.” 
But this is not a “return home”—the original Greek meaning of 
“nostalgia.” As [Ward sees] it there is at the moment a struggle between 
genuine and self-denying practices of piety and banal self-serving 
religious simulacra. [He takes] someone like Augustine or Aquinas or de 
Lubac or Rahner as providing benchmark reflections, for Christianity, of 
genuine and self-denying practices of piety. The “future” of religion I 
construct is not a fantasy (understood negatively as a wistful fabrication), 
rather it is an imagining—and an explicitly political one insofar as it is an 
imagining that pitches itself against the banal commodification and 
commercializations of pop transcendence. To be satisfied with, to be 
uncritical of, the kitsch and superficial, particularly with respect to the 




But these “benchmark reflections,” these “imaginings” (not “fantasies”) are no different 
from the “True-reality” I described in Section 1.02 in terms of the political leaders and 
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the protestors at the G20 meetings in Toronto. In the same way Žižek argues that 
communism is not even immune to the spectral law of capital insofar as it is just the 
obverse side of capitalism—it is still a system in which capital dictates the real world 
societal relationships of material things—Ward’s imagining does not escape the logic that 
requires the positing of a True abstraction. Indeed, Ward, and Radical Orthodoxy in 
general, may argue for the “decadence” of the abstraction which “expresses life’s 
ultimate values,”
267
 but they fail to address how such argumentation is any different than 
the decadence of the True-reality that the protestors or the bankers articulate in regards to 
the abstractions which express value in their lives. Again it seems that Ward’s talk “with 
respect to the sacred”
268




Indeed, as indicated by Ward in his quotation above, amidst all the theological 
turning one of the most powerful voices to be reinvigorated in recent thought, particularly 
in the work of Radical Orthodoxy, has been that of Thomas Aquinas. Radical Orthodox 
theologian D. Stephen Long argues in his book, Speaking of God, that the future of 
theological thought depends on how the next generation of theologians receives Thomas 
Aquinas.
270
 John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock have written at length about how 
Duns Scotus distorted True Thomism and as such we must return to the authentic Thomas 
for guidance in how one must engage the world in light of the failures of late 
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 And Radical Orthodoxy as a whole has drawn a significant amount of 
inspiration from the work of such Thomistic thinkers as Alasdair MacIntyre and Henri 
DeLubac, both of whom locate similar distortions of Thomism by the pious theologians 
who followed him. These theologians yearn for a “return” to pre-modern, True Thomistic 
ways of thinking in light of the distortions that happened to his thought after his death. 
However, in light of my discussion in regards to positing a True-reality/abstraction in 
Sections 1.02 of this thesis, it would seem that such radical theologies are simply 
repeating the same logic as Dennett’s philosophy. This is to say, theologies that yearn for 
a True pre-modern Thomistic notion of consciousness operate in accordance with the 
same foundational elements that Dennett’s naturalized ontology, the United Nations 
ontology of human rights or even Greenpeace’s ontology of a pure earth. To speak of 
Jesus Christ as simply the new ideal human from which we can determine evil a priori, 
that which “expresses life’s ultimate values,”
272
 although a decadent approach to 
thinking, does not actually offer a difference in terms of its logical foundations. In this 
sense, theology as understood from a Radically Orthodox Thomistic perspective simply 
offers another “universal acid”
273
 from which to engage reality. 
The obvious question at this point is, perhaps Radical Orthodoxy does indeed 
posit an abstraction from which to engage the world, but what other option is there? Must 
one posit an abstraction simply to be? Jacque Lacan’s formulae of sexuation would 
suggest that such is not exactly the case. As I described in Section 1.02 of this thesis, for 
Lacan there are two sides to the formulae of sexuation: the logic of the masculine side, as 
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opposed to the feminine side. I explained how Dennett’s philosophy forms an economy 
identical to the process of imposing a universal core in order to establish an ideological 
order:
274
 the universal acid known as Darwinian theory.
275
 The universal core inherently 
implies an exception which constitutes the universal as a universal and all other 
particulars are forced into the realm in which this core operates.
276
  This has enormous 
consequences for an ontology operating within the masculine side as all that is must be 
knowable in relation to the universal core; therefore, for example, if Dennett’s naturalized 
ontology is true, then all that is is that which can be known in relation to Darwinian 
theory. If Christianity sets up an abstraction called “Thomas Aquinas” or “the pre-
modern” then it follows the same logic as Dennett’s philosophy in that all that is must be 
understood in relation to a Thomistic notion of “God,” and thus, at its core Christianity is 
not distinguishable from Dennett’s philosophy. The alternative to the masculine side is 
the feminine side; however, and as Slavoj Žižek maintains, they are not symmetrical 
opposites, rather he argues that the feminine side has priority.
277
 The feminine side 
advocates a logic which refuses the notion of a closed system, refuses a whole or a 
One.
278
 All that is, only is insofar as it is revealed to the individual by way of the 
symbolic order, and because it is not everything that is, it is pas-tout. In establishing a 
pas-tout, or a “non-whole,” there is understood to be an absence of a static exception, of a 
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universal core.  The pas-tout operates within the what is and reflects the logic of the what 
is, but “society can never fully correspond to or overtake the [what is], yet the [what is] is 
operative everywhere in society, undermining and distorting it.”
279
  In this logical 
structure Žižek argues that a vanishing mediator, or fragile absolute, manifests itself at 
the site of a particular event in relation to the universal. In language almost 
uncharacteristic to Žižek he describes the fragile absolute as 
[s]omething that appears to us in fleeting experiences—say through the 
gentle smile of a beautiful woman, or even through the warm caring smile 
of a person who may otherwise seem ugly and rude: in such miraculous 
but extremely fragile moments, another dimension transpires through our 
reality. As such, the Absolute is easily corroded; it slips all too easily 
through our fingers, and must be handled as carefully as a butterfly.
280
 
Within this space Žižek understands the functioning of a proper universal/particular 
dialectic which brings us into relationship with the what is. 
There is insight into Lacan’s formulae of sexuation to be found in the Book of 
Daniel and the Book of Job. The Book of Daniel is filled with famous images of dreadful 
dreams and apocalyptic visions: the vision of a fourth figure in the fiery furnace, the 
mysterious hand writing on the wall, Nebuchadnezzar’s vision of a huge tree being cut 
down, Daniel’s vision of the great beasts, the seventy septets and the North and South 
Kings. Interestingly, there is a division in the book as to how these visions are presented. 
Prior to Daniel 7, all the visions were first given from God to a character other than 
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Daniel: to Nebuchadnezzar in Daniel 2 and 4 as dreams and to Belshazzar in Daniel 5 as 
mysterious writing. In all these instances, although God did not originally give the 
visions directly to Daniel, God only gave Daniel the True interpretations and the True 
meanings of the dreams. Because he was in possession of the Truth, Daniel was then 
capable of bringing the interpretations and the meanings of the visions to the kings 
wherein they could then possess the newly unencrypted meanings. In contrast to the first 
section of the Book of Daniel, in what I understand to be a second section beginning in 
Daniel 7, God first gives the visions to Daniel and then by way of another character 
Daniel is told the interpretation. Interestingly, however, despite the fact that Daniel is 
given the meaning of the vision, he is continually left incapable of understanding the 
meaning of the interpretation: “I was appalled by the vision; it was beyond 
understanding” (Dan 8: 27); “I heard, but I did not understand” (Dan 12: 8). These two 
sections can be summarized as follows: in the first section, Daniel 1 – 6, Daniel is not the 
first to receive the visions, however, Daniel is the first (and only) to receive the 
interpretations and the meanings of the dreams which he is then capable transmitting to 
others. In the second section, Daniel 7 – 12, Daniel is the first (and only) to receive the 
visions, he is given the interpretations via some other character, and yet he himself is left 
incapable of understanding the meaning (and thus he is incapable of transmitting their 
meaning to any other character). This distinction between the first and the second 
section—that is, between the subtle switch in how God distributes the elements of the 
hermeneutical structure of Daniel (vision/sign → interpretation → understanding/true 
meaning)—in the Book of Daniel is precisely the distinction between the masculine and 
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feminine logics: the masculine logic being demonstrated in the first section and the 
feminine logic being demonstrated in the second. 
This distinction is further demonstrated in the Book of Job. As in the second 
section of the Book of Daniel, one of the central themes to be located in the Book of Job, 
although requiring the rest of the text as a whole, comes from its concluding chapter.  As 
Yakov Leib HaKohain has written: “The closing passages of Job are a paradigm of the 
Final Days, the End of Time, and the destiny of Israel, the Jewish People, as an agent of 
that apotheosis. Just as Job’s three Edomite-gentile friends attach themselves to him for 
their salvation, so God swore to Israel: ‘The gentile will join [you] and attach himself to 
the House of Jacob’ (Isa. 14:1, 2).”
281
 However, and in accordance with Slavoj Žižek, this 
does not mean that the conclusion of the Book of Job should be interpreted in agreement 
with the traditional view that the book’s true meaning is that even in the absence of 
meaning, that God has a meaning-full plan. Such masculine logic constructs an image of 
God’s understanding as forming a complete set (which are abstractions to humanity) from 
which humanity is on occasion incapable of deciphering; however, if we are to face God 
Himself we would have an objective view of this set. Interestingly, such a view implies 
that not understanding is in-itself a form of understanding.  If we accept this masculine 
logic of God’s understanding, Job becomes characterized as a patient sufferer who 
endures all that God puts upon him with blind faith. Consequently, this logic provides an 
account of suffering which we can then read as analogous to the suffering in our own 
lives: if God has a reason for everything (death, hunger, depression…), then we must 
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always have faith that God has a meaningful plan even if we do not understand. In 
contrast, Žižek argues against the interpretation that the lesson of Job is that in the face of 
meaninglessness in the world, God has a plan for us. He argues 
Job’s properly ethical dignity lies in the way he persistently rejects the 
notion that his suffering can have any meaning, either punishment for his 
past sins or the trial of his faith, against the three theologians who 
bombard him with possible meanings—and, surprisingly, God takes his 
side at the end, claiming that every word Job spoke was true, while every 
word the three theologians spoke was false.
282
 
Considering the Book of Daniel in the same light suggests that the subtle alteration of the 
hermeneutical structure in the second section of the Book of Daniel demonstrates that in 
the second section of Daniel the logic of the relationship between the sign and its 
meaning changes along with God’s means of disseminating the particular elements of the 
hermeneutical structure. In the second part of Daniel, in contrast to the first part, utilizing 
a feminine reading of the text, God does not give Daniel the understanding of the End 
Times because there is no-understanding. God does not give Daniel the understanding of 
the interpretation, as he did in the first section, because God does not have any 
understanding of the End. In the same way we can logically think of the nature of the 
material world as inherently incomplete, we can logically think of the nature of 
understanding as inherently incomplete. Unlike when using masculine logic, when 
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utilizing a feminine logic there is no set of understanding that when considered together 
forms a whole; rather, understanding is always in a state of lack. 
From such a position, Žižek argues that God is recognized as a weak figure, and 
perhaps Daniel was well aware of this divine helplessness. For otherwise, in the second 
section Daniel, in a state of sheer frustration, surely would have said to God: “What is the 
deal here? Since the day I was captured by the Babylonians you have been giving me 
understanding after understanding, and all the magicians, sorcerers and kings down here 
have been really impressed with what I have been capable of transmitting to them, why 
not anymore?” On the contrary, Daniel behaves in the same way Job behaved when faced 
with the same conundrum from the same God. As Žižek writes in regards to Job’s 
behavior in the conclusion of the Book of Job: 
[Job] remained silent neither because he was crushed by God’s 
overwhelming presence, nor because he wanted thereby to indicate his 
continuous resistance—the fact that God avoided answering his 
question—but because, in a gesture of silent solidarity, he perceived the 
divine impotence. God is neither just nor unjust, but simply impotent. 
What Job suddenly understood was that it was not him, but God himself 
who was in effect on trial in Job’s calamities, and he failed the test 
miserably. Even more pointedly, I am tempted to risk a radical 
anachronistic reading: Job foresaw God’s own future suffering—“Today 
it’s me, tomorrow it will be your own son, and there will be no one to 
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And cannot the same radical anachronistic reading prefiguring the Passion of the Christ 
be made in the Book of Daniel? In Daniel 8, what I have defined as the second section of 
the Book, Daniel has a vision of God Himself suffering on Earth: “[The little horn] grew 
until it reached the host of the heavens, and it threw some of the starry host down to the 
earth and trampled on them. It set itself up to be as great as the commander of the army of 
the LORD; it took away the daily sacrifice from the LORD, and his sanctuary was thrown 
down.  Because of rebellion, the LORD’s people and the daily sacrifice were given over 
to it. It prospered in everything it did, and truth was thrown to the ground.” (Daniel 8: 10 
– 12)  Even the language used here is reminiscent of Jesus falling on three separate 
occasions: “threw some of the starry host down to the earth and trampled on them,” “his 
sanctuary was thrown down,” and “truth was thrown to the ground.” 
Indeed, the argument could be made that Daniel could not possibly be prefiguring 
the Passion, because the event which is the Passion had not yet been at the time in which 
the Book of Daniel was written; however, in Dan 8: 15 – 17, Daniel is very clear that he 
does not understand the vision: “While I, Daniel, was watching the vision and trying to 
understand it, there before me stood one who looked like a man. And I heard a man’s 
voice from the Ulai calling, ‘Gabriel, tell this man the meaning of the vision.’ As he came 
near the place where I was standing, I was terrified and fell prostrate. ‘Son of man,’ he 
said to me, ‘understand that the vision concerns the time of the end.’” (Dan 8: 15 – 17)  
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The key to note here is that Daniel can see the vision but he does not understand it; not 
because there is something to be understood, but because at the time when Daniel is 
seeing this vision there is no-understanding, and as such Daniel wants nothing. Daniel 
refuses to turn away from God to say “This is a hard teaching; who can understand it?” 
(Jn 6: 60) Of course, we can now look back and possess the understanding (Christ the 
Father’s only son is given as a perfect offering, light from light, to save humanity through 
the power of the Holy Spirit), but just because we can do so does not necessarily imply 
that this understanding always was. On the contrary, as indicated by Gabriel in Dan 8: 17, 
there was no-understanding until the arrival of Christ, through whom all is made new: 
“Through him all things came to be, not one thing had its being but through him” (John 1: 
3). In the same way that we cannot assume that the reality of the physical world stays 
“what-it-is,” we cannot assume that God has a plan “all-the-way-down” that he 
chronologically reveals to humanity.
284
  In this way, and in accordance with Daniel and 
Job, the Truth of reality is not clarity of the now, but rather the promise of the new. 
 
1.13  Number: To speak of the Other 
 
The first volume of essays collected under the name “Radical Orthodoxy”, Radical 
Orthodoxy: A New Theology, make it extremely clear who the movement as a whole 
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understands to be the villain (albeit an ignorant and pious villain) responsible for the 
inadequate state of theology in late modernity: Duns Scotus.
285
 According to Radical 
Orthodoxy, Scotus’s re-interpretations of certain key aspects of Thomistic thought—most 
significantly, his shift from the analogy of being to the univocity of being—were to have 
detrimental effects on the future of not only theology, but ontology in general. This is to 
say, for Radical Orthodoxy, Duns Scotus marks an extremely significant, if not decisive 
point in history in which ontological thought was not only radically altered, but more 
importantly, radically altered for the worse. 
To understand the nature of this ontological shift one must first consider how 
Scotus understands of the infinite. For Scotus the finite represents a part of the infinite. It 
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is a quantitative, as opposed to a qualitative, measurement or unit. One can only 
understand the infinite in that it is both a part of, and juxtaposed to the finite. Thus, the 
infinite is dependent on the finite and predisposed to the finite’s limitations. The infinite 
exists only as an essence, unlike the finite which has corporeal presence, and is therefore 
above every assignable proportion because such proportions are made by the limitations 
of the finite; however, there is an infinite proportion that can be said to exist but is 
nonetheless impossible to comprehend because of the fact that one can only understand 
the infinite in terms of the finite. This incommunicable measure is the is-ness of being.
286
 
It follows that, for Scotus, the difference between the natural and the supernatural is one 
of degree. As described in Section 1.03 of this thesis, such an understanding of number is 
precisely in line with the notion of number which Badiou critiques, that is, One-ness.
287
 
Or in other words, the notion of number constructed in terms of the infinite set of natural 
numbers by the process, nk = nk-1 + 1, where the infinite is always approached, never 
reached, but nonetheless can be thought of in terms of the single set which forms a whole 
or a One, N = {1, 2, 3, …}. This is the same form of number I have shown, apropos 
Badiou, as the necessary foundation for capitalist ideology (and also the form of number I 
have been contrasting with a Cantorian understanding of number). In this sense, Radical 
Orthodoxy is right to critique the form of number inherent in theology post-Scotus; 
however, the question remains as to whether or not Radical Orthodoxy is prepared to 
offer an alternative to this notion of number. If the movement cannot do so, then it is 
trapped operating in accordance with the same form of number which they critique; a 
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Badiouian thinking of the One. This is to say, they fall victim to the same fate as 
Nietzsche in his attempt to critique the very existence of number: that is, he had to use a 
form of number to critique number, namely a form of One-ness. 
Rather than explicitly addressing an alternative form of number, Radical 
Orthodoxy refutes the univocity of being by appealing to Thomas Aquinas’ analogia 
entis. The difference between univocity and analogy is perhaps best explicated in terms 
of how language functions for both Saint Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus. Both 
theologians agree that knowledge of God starts from creatures and that we cannot know 
the essence of the supernatural in the natural. They disagree in their understanding of the 
functioning of theological semantics. For Saint Thomas, words can only be used 
analogically to speak of God, and therefore, words applied to God have a different 
meaning when applied to creatures; a process he terms analogical predication. Such 
thinking exposes how Aquinas was significantly concerned with the logic of existential 
statements. In an essay dealing with Aquinas’s notion of esse, Peter Geach
288
 deals with 
the logic of three different forms of existential statements: existential statements (1) with 
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proper nouns as their grammatical subjects, (2) with common nouns as their grammatical 
subjects, and (3) which ascribe passed actuality to some bearer of a proper name.
289
 
Geach first examines existential statements with proper nouns as their grammatical 
subjects and concludes that in this case it is only the use of the proper name which is at 
stake. Propositions of this form only serve to deny that in this use the name actually 
names anything.
290
 Geach then considers existential statements with a common noun (as 
opposed to a proper noun) as their grammatical subject.
291
  As Aquinas recognized, there 
is something peculiar about this form of existential statement: that is, to make the 
statement “x exists” when x is a common noun does not attribute actuality to an x, but the 
quality of x-ness to something or other.
292
 For example, consider one of the fundamental 
statements Einstein needs to make in establishing his theory of general relativity: “four-
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dimensional space-time exists.” It is impossible to imagine any-thing in regards to what 
four-dimensional space-time is;
293
 however, we can observe the effects of a four-
dimensional space-time which “is curved, or ‘warped,’ by the distribution of mass and 
energy in it.”
294
  The statement “four-dimensional space-time exists,” does not expose 
any-thing in regards to some explicit knowledge of four-dimensional space-time, but 
rather, applies some quality of four-dimensional space-time-ness to the universe. Denys 
Turner uses the example of a computer to illustrate this same point: most people have no 
idea what a computer is insofar as how it operates, however, they are very capable of 
using the term “computer” because they know of it effects: it provides email messages, 
simulates video games, and makes power point presentations. Turner writes: “The use of 
a descriptive term is not dependent on an explicit knowledge of the reality which that 
term is describing, but on an implicit knowledge which results from our familiarity with 
(the effects of) that reality.”
295
 Finally, Geach considers existential statements which 
ascribe passed actuality to some bearer of a proper name by considering the phrase from 
Gen 42: 36, “Joseph is not and Simeon is not.” In this passage Jacob is clearly referring 
to the death of his two sons, however, “[i]f somebody has died (is no more), the bearer of 
the name has disappeared, but the reference is still intact.”
296
 Here, unlike in the first case 
which also deals with proper nouns, “the problem of non-being cannot occur because, 
once a proper noun has referred to an individual, it keeps doing so, even after the bearer 
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of the name does no longer exist.”
297
 Therefore the third form of existential statement 
indicates actuality. Aquinas summarized these three forms of existential statements in 
terms of esse: “‘To be’ can mean either of two things. It may mean the act of essence 
[actus essendi], or it may mean the composition of a proposition effected by the mind in 
joining a predicate to a subject.”
298
 The first two forms of existential statements apply to 
the second form of esse of which Aquinas speaks: “to the signifying the mental uniting of 
predicate to subject which constitutes a proposition.”
299
 The third form of existential 




This distinction is precisely the distinction I summarized in accordance with 
Badiou in Section 1.03 of this thesis. There I described how Badiou clearly articulates 
science articulates knowledge about things which science itself need not act in 
accordance with. This distinction was described by Badiou as the difference between 
being and existence. As I described, Badiou understands there to be two main opponents 
of philosophy: the positivist position—that all there is is knowledge—and the nihilist 
position—that knowledge itself is not important. Badiou argued on the contrary, that truth 
is a process which is only possible when carried out in relation to an event.
301
 In a similar 
way Jean Porter explains how “Aquinas argues, every human person necessarily acts for 
some single end, which provides the overarching motivation in terms of which all her 
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actions can ultimately be explained.”
302
  Like with Badiou’s truth process, this motivation 
may differ between subjects, but in some sense all these acts are the same, as every 
human being seeks truth in one way or another.
303
  Just as human beings have an innate 
desire for food or sex, we also have an innate desire for truth and meaning.
304
  As David 
Bentley Hart describes, “human nature’s perfection (τελειότης) is nothing but this endless 
desire for beauty and more beauty, this hunger for God.”
305
  In accordance with Badiou, 
our ability to reason shapes and directs this desire
306
 and consequently “[f]or Thomas 
[…] reason already, and in its own nature, as it were ‘anticipates’ the structurally 
‘mystical’ character of faith itself.”
307
 
This somewhat radical position in contemporary culture is not unique among 
medieval theologians.
308
 For example, Saint Bonaventure maintained that Christian faith 
“elevates human reason to see divine things, stabilizes it in truth, and fills the human 
mind with a multiform lumen enabling the mind to speculate about the things of God.”
309
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Turner describes how Bonaventure’s work Itinerarium Mentis in Deum (The Mind’s 
Road to God) shows how 
through the drama of Christ’s life on the one hand and death on the other, 
through the recapitulation of the symbolic weight and density of creation 
in his human nature on the one hand and its destruction on the cross on the 
other, the complex interplay of affirmative and negative is fused and 
concretely realized.  In Christ, therefore, is there not only the visibility of 
the Godhead, but also the invisibility: if Christ is the Way, Christ is, in 
short, our way into the unknowability of God, not so as ultimately to 
comprehend it, but so as to be brought into participation with the Deus 
absconditus precisely as unknown.
310
 
In contrast to post-Kantian attempts at doing theology, in pre-modern theology the 
tensions between knowing and unknowing reveal the very structure and 
dynamic of reason itself.  What shows the existence of God shows that we 
can speak of God—theology is possible.  But precisely that which shows 
the existence of God shows also and at the same time, and in the same 
determination of proof, that we cannot have any final hold on what we 
mean when we do so—so theology is inherently uncompletable, open-
ended, a ‘broken language’.
311
 
Contrary to Thomas’s view of theology as an “inherently uncompletable, open-
ended, [and broken] language’” Scotus claims that certain words can be used with the 
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same meaning when used to speak of God and when used to speak of creatures; a process 
he terms univocal predication.
312
 In Scotus’s univocal predication, all terms designating 
meaning can be understood to fit into one of three categories. All predicates that do not 
designate anything regarding what God is in Her essence but only how She is related to 
other things are discarded. All remaining words are classified in one of two ways after 
being put through the following test. Consider the predicate x.  It is either (a) better in 
every respect to be x then not to be x, or, (b) in some respect better to be not x than x. Any 
x within category (a) is labeled a “pure perfection” and understood to be any predicate 
that can be used to univocally speak of God.
313
 For Scotus, this process allows for a 
discourse capable of projecting an accurate concept of God. Take, for example, goodness; 
I know how much goodness I have, I know that priests have some other degree of 
goodness, Mother Theresa had a greater degree of goodness and thus I can deduce the 
enormity that is the goodness of God. Radical Orthodox theologian Catherine Pickstock 
argues that this process of speaking of God results in what she refers to as a “mimetic 
doubling” insofar as it cannot involve any form of elevation of the actual represented 
finite.
314
 Thus, this process is guilty of forming the abstractions discussed in the previous 
section, Section 1.12. As Pickstock rightfully explains, “[W]hen the mind abstracts being 
from finitude, it undergoes no elevation but simply isolates something formally empty, 
something that is already in effect a transcendentally a priori category and no longer 
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transcendental in the usual mediaeval sense of a metaphysically universal category which 
applies to all beings as such, with or without material instantiation.”
315
 
 Radical Orthodoxy’s distinction between the analogy of being and the univocity 
of being clearly identifies there to be problems with using a notion of One-ness when 
thinking ontologically. Furthermore, as I have shown, this distinction demonstrates 
Badiou’s close proximity to Aquinas in his understanding of truth. A closeness one can 
observe as being acknowledged by Radical Orthodox theologians as well: for example, 
Catherine Pickstock Pickstock rightfully identifies Badiou’s notion of the event as 
presenting a “secular account of grace.”
316
 During the third lecture of the Stanton 
Lecutures in Cambridge in 2011, “Number and Immanence,” John Milbank stated 
[I]s paradox really such a problem? Does not modern science exploit the 
mathematics that engenders paradox and throw up paradoxes of its own? 
Moreover, the one recent thinker, who, beyond Quine’s gestures has 
attempted a systematic mathematical ontology, namely Alain Badiou, has 
embraced it precisely because he is attracted by the paradoxes. For it is the 
latter, he suggests, which allow a mathematical ontology to be non-
reductive: by exposing the holes, gaps or cracks in ontological reality they 
suggest the obscure spaces in which both phenomenal and the subjective 
realities can emerge into being: singular, self-founded realities ‘beyond 
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being’ in the sense of the ontological repertoire, and so themselves not 
subject to any mathematical accounting.
317
 
In this sense, both Radical Orthodoxy and Badiou share in Augustine’s “constant and 
almost obsessive concern with the Platonic ‘aporia of learning’—how can I seek for 
knowledge of something if I do not already know it; yet how can I know something 
without having come to know it.”
318
 This aporia rightly demonstrates how a true and 
proper ontology refuses all “metaphysical foundationalisms which fantasise either 
empirical givens which precede our knowledge of them or else a priori modes of 
knowledge somehow given in advance of our actually knowing anything.”
319
 From this 
shared perspective the concern that Radical Orthodoxy presents to Badiou is the idea that 
in his system contingent possibility itself becomes the metaphysical foundation of 
being.
320
 As Milbank describes, 
The problem for possibility left to its own devices as it were, without the 
assistance of either the Good or of God, is that it has to produce 
‘insistence’ from chance and arbitrariness without a will. And the result of 
trying to supply it with an ‘insistent’ force on the one hand, or the power 
of randomness on the other, is that it tends to get supplied after all with a 
kind of quasi-actuality -- indeed as we have seen with a ‘virtuality’ and 
with a quasi-will, as with Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Beyond the latter, 
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the poet Stephane Mallarmé tried to construe the world as simply a ‘throw 
of the dice’. But the recourse to chance rather than force or decision 




Without theology preparing the way for God to somehow mysteriously act in relationship 
with reality—via sacraments, prayer, liturgy, etc.—Badiou is stranded in a helpless and 
constant state of perpetual waiting. 
In denying the possibility of speaking of reality apart from God, Radical 
Orthodoxy clearly awards theology the role of policing both that which can be said of 
reality and the conditions in which reality may be made material: through such material 
things as bread, water, wine, or flesh. As I have shown in this section, Radical Orthodoxy 
reasons that such discourse is properly articulated in accordance with the writings of 
Thomas Aquinas, and furthermore, that such ways of thinking are strikingly resonant 
with the work of Badiou himself. However, in universalizing Thomistic ways of thinking 
about reality Radical Orthodoxy must also prohibit Badiou’s thinking of the event in a 
general sense, because for the theologian there is only one True-event; Christ’s death, 
resurrection and ascension. Only theology can enforce the words and conditions which 
make the reoccurrence of this event possible, what Catherine Pickstock describes as the 
condition for the possibility of meaning.
322
 In contrast to Badiou, there is never creation 
ex nihilo, and as such, Radical Orthodoxy proclaims there to be no need to helplessly 
wait for an event simply because it has already arrived. Theological discourse is not only 
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necessary for the sake of the real, it is readily available to all of humanity; there is no 
need to helplessly wait. 
And yet, such a confident stance seems strange given Milbank’s conclusion to his 
2005 book, Being Reconciled. There Milbank writes, “The Gospel concerns, above all for 
us today, this issue of affinity….Affinity is the absolutely nontheorizable, it is the almost 
ineffable. Affinity is the mysterium….[W]e cannot say in what respect we are like God; 
the image [of God] simply is an ineffable likeness.”
323
 I am left wondering why Milbank 
works so hard to instill a theological tyranny, only to then turn around and for a brief 
moment surrender it to silence. I am reminded of the closing passage of Elizabeth 
Bishop’s famous villanelle, “One Art”: 
—Even losing you (the joking voice, a gesture 
I love) I shan’t have lied.  It’s evident 
the art of losing’s not hard to master 
though it may look like (Write it!) like disaster.
324
 
Bishop, mourning the suicide of her partner, contemplates the event of losing; something 
that has taken place at various levels throughout her life, from the simple losing of car 
keys to the difficult loss of her mother. Throughout the poem she insists she has always 
persevered, that she has mastered the art of losing, and so she will overcome this loss as 
well, and yet, in the last line through the bracketed phrase, Write it!, Bishop sacrifices all 
of her previous confidence. She has not mastered the art of losing and the disaster it 
                                                 
323
 Milbank, Being Reconciled, p. 203. 
324





brings; this time, despite what she tells herself over and over again, she is no longer the 
woman she was: after this event, she will not remain the same. 
In opposition to the theological and the positivist forms of discursive closure, 
Badiou refuses the belief that we can know of all the elements in a situation: that which is 
is inherently incomplete. And as such no theology can create the conditions in which 
truth is made manifest. In accordance with Radical Orthodoxy, Badiou says that the 
Christian subject can only be insofar as it comes about through the Christ-event, and yet, 
as Ben Woodard argues, in contrast to Radical Orthodoxy “effability is not the guilty and 
unfortunate necessity of a ‘fallen world’; declaration is instead the first mode through 
which the subject emerges.”
325
 In a world in which capitalist logic permeates all 
understandings of worth, when thought is blackmailed into either going along with 
Enlightenment values or pitting oneself against them, when love is exchanged for banal 
romanticism and mere sexuality, from the most talented philosopher to the most 
mysterious mystic, (Write it!) it is Badiou’s logic which truly offers a new opportunity 
for thinking of reality. 
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